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Bringing Polluters Before Transnational
Courts: Why Industry Should Demand Strict
and Unlimited Liability for the
Transnational Movements of Hazardous
and Radioactive Wastes
ELLI LOUKA*
C'est parce qu'on ne le tient jamais jusqu'au bout que rien n'est
obtenu. Mais il suffit peut-tre de rester logique jusqu'd la fin
-Albert Camus
This article prescribes an international private liability regime for
the transnational movements of hazardous and radioactive wastes. Pre-
scription of such a regime is particularly relevant because the Basel Con-
vention for the transfrontier movements of hazardous wastes' has entered
* Ford Foundation Fellow, New York University School of Law. This article was first
presented at a dinner meeting organized by Professor Thomas Franck, Director of the
Center for International Studies at New York University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Thomas Franck for organizing this meeting for me from which this article
has immensely benefitted. I am grateful to Professor Richard Stewart for his insightful com-
ments on the preliminary drafts of the manuscript, Professor Michael Reisman for valuable
suggestions and unremitting support, and Professor Chet Mirsky for his encouragement.
Professor Ginther Handl and Ms. Christianne Bourloyannis, legal officer at the United Na-
tions, have been most helpful in providing the most recent bibliography. Ms. Senita Birbal,
inter-library loan co-ordinator at the N.Y.U. Law Library has been of tremendous assistance
in helping accumulate the necessary bibliography.
1. The Basel Convention on the Control on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter
Basel Convention]. The Basel Convention is the first Convention that deals with the prob-
lem of transnational movements of hazardous wastes. The Convention establishes prior noti-
fication and informed consent as an indispensable prerequisite of international waste trans-
ports. The Basel Convention was the international community's response to an
accumulation of international incidents in the late 1980's involving waste transfers to devel-
oping countries. For example, in June of 1988, drums of mislabeled construction material
were dumped in the Nigeria port of Koko. The Nigerian authorities seized the ship and
arrested those responsible. In addition, Guinea Bissau was offered three times its GNP in
order to accept wastes from the United States and Europe. In Congo the minister for the
environment and other top-ranking officials were arrested in two toxic waste dumping deals.
See generally ELLI LOUKA, THE TRANSNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS AND RADIOAC-
TIVE WASTES 3-6 (Yale Law School, Schell Center Series ed., 1992).
Transfrontier waste movements continue unabated until today. See infra notes 280-82.
African countries felt that the prior informed consent prescribed by the Basel Convention
could not prevent waste exports into Africa and adopted the Bamako Convention that bans
waste imports into the African region. See Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import of
All Forms of Hazardous Waste Into Africa, Jan 29, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991)
[hereinafter Bamako Convention]. For Annexes, see 31 I.L.M. 163 (1992). See generally
LOUKA, supra at 9-11.
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into force, 2 and a protocol that will deal with liability and compensation
issues is under negotiation.3
As evidenced by the-oil and nuclear liability regimes, strict and lim-
ited liability has been the prevailing form of liability in international law.
This prevalence is due to the belief that a form of unlimited liability will
hamper insurance availability. The purpose of this article is to defeat the
myth that strict and unlimited liability is responsible for the lack of in-
surance for environmental harms. This study demonstrates that strict
and unlimited liability cannot be blamed solely for the failure of tradi-
tional insurance markets and that the emergence of alternative insurance
worldwide will provide waste management and chemical industries with
adequate insurance coverage.
The fact that strict and unlimited liability does not hamper insur-
ance is not the only reason why it should be prescribed as the appropriate
liability regime for transnational waste movements. Contribution to pre-
vention of accidents caused by waste mismanagement, initiation of direct
democratic controls into the international system, and appeasement of so-
cial conflicts are additional reasons why the establishment of strict and
unlimited liability is imperative.
But strict and unlimited liability, while necessary, is not adequate.
When industries are unable to compensate pollution victims, a social in-
surance mechanism in the form of a fund that would provide immediate
relief and residual or full compensation is necessary. Such a fund could be
financed by states, industries, or a combination of both. Because of the
lack of data of the contribution of each industrial sector to accidents
caused by wastes, it would desirable if the fund develops in two stages as
analyzed in Section III of this article.
I. INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY REGIMES
A. The Oil Pollution Regime
The oil pollution regime is the only comprehensive private liability
regime in international law. The oil pollution regime vividly illustrates
the preoccupation of the oil industry with limited liability as the type of
2. United Nations Officials See Basel Treaty as Limping into Effect with Limited
Support, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), May 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File. The Convention needed twenty ratifications in order to enter into force. At pre-
sent, the following twenty-two countries have ratified the Convention: Argentina, Australia,
China, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Finland, France, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Liechten-
stein, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Syria, and Uruguay. It is interesting to note that the United States and the member
states of the European Community (EC), except for France, have not ratified the Conven-
tion. The United States and the European Community countries are the major exporters of
hazardous wastes.
3. The current negotiations also involve the creation of an emergency fund. See Deci-
sions 1/5 and 1/14 of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, UNEP/CHW.1/
24, Annex II (Dec. 1992).
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liability that will not jeopardize insurance availability. It is essential to
mention that the first conventions dealing with oil pollution were conven-
tions on limitations of liability, and that the idea of limiting liability for
oil pollution damage preceded the idea of creating a comprehensive re-
gime for oil pollution.
4
The current international regime of oil pollution is comprised of the
1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage' and the
1971 Fund Convention.6 These Conventions were amended by the 1984
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage' and the 1984
Fund Convention.' To be party to a Fund Convention, states must be
parties to the respective Liability Convention. The initial Conventions
and their amendments co-exist, and states can be parties to one or both
of them at the same time.9
The oil and tanker industry is anxious to avoid liability under inter-
national conventions and has accordingly devised voluntary compensation
schemes. One such scheme, the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), provides for strict
and limited liability of shipowners just as the Conventions on Civil Lia-
bility do. Another scheme, the Contract Regarding an Interim Supple-
ment to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), provides for a
fund similar to those prescribed by the Fund Conventions.'" By adopting
4. See, e.g., International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea Going Vessels, Aug. 25, 1924, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONVENTIONS 1383 (Ignacio Arroyo ed., 1991); International Con-
vention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships, Oct. 10, 1957,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONVENTIONS 1389 (Ignacio Arroyo ed., 1991).
5. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S.
3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970) [hereinafter 1969 Convention]. See also Protocol to the
1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 19, 1976,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 617 (1977) (the purpose of this Protocol was to amend the-"Unit of
Account" in which limits of liability are expressed. The initial unit was the gold franc; the
Protocol replaced it with "Special Drawing Rights" (SDRs)).
6. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Com-
pensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONVEN-
TIONS ON MARITIME LAW 236 (Comit6 Maritime International ed., 1987)[hereinafter 1971
Fund Convention]. See also Protocol to International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, Nov. 19, 1976,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 621 (1977).
7. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, May 25, 1984, reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVI-
RONMENT 1 (Bernd Rister & Bruno Simma eds., 1990) [hereinafter Protocol of 1984 to
Amend 1969 Convention].
8. Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, May 25, 1984, reprinted
in 2 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 21 (Bernd Ruster and Bruno Simma
eds., 1990)[hereinafter 1984 Fund Convention].
9. DAVID W. ABECASSIS & RICHARD L. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS: INTERNA-
TIONAL, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES, LAW AND PRACTICE 246-47 (1985).
10. Id. at 303.
[T]he two schemes operate together as an integrated whole, but they do not
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voluntary compensation schemes, the oil industry has hoped to demon-
strate to governments that international treaties are unnecessary or at
least to influence the emerging international norms for oil pollution."
The industry has failed in both endeavors. The 1969 Convention and the
1971 Fund Convention have entered into force, and the 1984 regime is far
more progressive than the one advocated by industry.1"
The 1969 Convention imposes on shipowners strict and limited liabil-
ity for oil pollution damage' s and joint and several liability when two or
more ships are involved and the pollution damage is not reasonably sepa-
rable. 14 Shipowners can limit their liability to a specific amount by creat-
ing a limitation fund.15 However, they are not entitled to limited liability
if the incident that caused pollution is the result of their "fault or priv-
ity.""6 The concept of "fault or privity" is not further explained in the
1969 Convention. The 1984 Convention clarified it by providing that ship-
owners are not entitled to limit their liability if it is proved that the pol-
lution damage was the outcome of an intentional act or omission, or from
reckless behavior and with knowledge that such damage would probably
result.' 7 Reckless behavior, however, is a flexible concept providing courts
with significant latitude to impose unlimited liability.
The limitation fund established by the owner is distributed among
the claimants in proportion to the amount of their claims. The distribu-
tion of claims is a smooth procedure when the total amount claimed does
not exceed the limitation fund established by the owner, otherwise it may
be delayed."B
apply to cases actually covered by their respective international legal counter-
parts: a claimant cannot recover under both the Fund Convention and CRIS-
TAL, for instance, but he can recover under the Liability Convention and
CRISTAL if the Fund Convention does not apply to the case.
Id. See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, MARITIME LAW 311-16 (1989).
11. ABECASSlS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 304.
12. Id.
13. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. 111(2). According to article 111(2), shipowners
are exempt from liability in cases of force majeure, or when pollution damage is wholly
caused by a third party with the intent to cause such damage, or by negligence or a wrongful
act of a government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other
navigational aids. The term "navigational aids" is too vague. In an incident involving the oil
pollution of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet tanker, the Soviet tanker was able to
prove that the pollution was due to a failure to mark a rock on the navigation chart. See
HILL, supra note 10, at 291.
14. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. IV.
15. According to article V(1) as amended in 1976, shipowners can limit their liability to
an amount of 133 SDRs for each ton of the ship's weight. This amount shall not exceed
fourteen million SDRs. See supra note 5.
16. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2).
17. Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 6(2).
18. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 217. The fund has been involved in sixty
cases. In one case, it had not been possible to fully compensate the damage. Another case
where claims may exceed the limit is still pending. See GUnther Doeker & Thomas Gehring,
RESEARCH PAPER No. 32, in LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 30 (United Nations Con-
VOL. 22:1
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Under the Convention, the plaintiff can bring an action for compen-
sation only in the courts of the contracting state where the damage oc-
curred.' 9 Nonetheless, according to conflicts of law rules, a plaintiff can
bring an action in the courts of a non-contracting state if the person re-
sponsible for the pollution damage is domiciled within that state.
20
The Convention also provides for compulsory insurance of shipown-
ers registered in a contracting state and carrying more than two thousand
tons of oil in bulk.21 One of the advantages of compulsory insurance is
that it drives out of the market those shipowners who do not have ade-
quate assets to cover possible pollution damage. This effect is tempered,
however, by the fact that only those shipowners carrying two thousand
tons of oil are required to maintain insurance.2' National governments
must enforce the compulsory insurance provision by ensuring that the
ships they register maintain insurance and carry an insurance certificate
on board. 2  Ships registered in contracting states with no insurance certif-
icate are not allowed to engage in the business of carrying oil.24 Ships
registered in non-contracting states are also required to hold such a cer-
tificate whenever they enter or leave ports or off-shore terminals of con-
tracting states.2" This prevents those shipowners from acquiring a com-
petitive advantage over ships of contracting states.26  The 1984
Convention further clarifies that contracting states should mutually rec-
ognize the certificates they issue and that a ship registered in a non-con-
tracting state can obtain such a certificate from the authorities of any
contracting state.27
ference on the Environment and Development ed., 1992) [hereinafter UNCED].
19. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. IX. Article VIII also provides that the plaintiff
has no right to compensation if she brings an action after three years from the date the
damage occurred. No action can be brought after six years from the date of the incident
that caused the damage.
20. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 220-21.
[T]his has been dramatically illustrated in the Amoco Cadiz case off France (a
contracting state) in 1978, where French plaintiffs, including the French gov-
ernment, instituted actions in the United States (which was not a contracting
state) where the managers of the ship were domiciled. The other defendants
included the owner, registered in Liberia (a contracting state) and the ship
builder, registered in Spain (also a contracting state). The United States Court
of Appeals rejected the plea of forum non conveniens made by the ship
builder, and the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois proceeded
to enter judgment against the owners, the managers, and their parent com-
pany.(citations omitted).
Id. See also Tullio Scovazzi, Industrial Accidents and the Veil of Transnational Corpora-
tions, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 395, 413-21 (Francesco
Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL HARM].
21. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. VII(1).
22. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 224.
23. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. VII(2), (4).
24. Id. art. VII (10).
25. Id. art. VII(11).
26. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 225.
27. Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 7.
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The 1969 Convention applies exclusively to pollution damage caused
within the territory or the territorial sea of contracting states.2 8 Pollution
damage is defined as loss or damage caused from the escape or discharge
of oil from a ship carrying oil."' The loss or damage also includes "the
costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by pre-
ventive measures."30 Preventive measures, in turn, are defined as reasona-
ble measures taken after the oil spill has occurred for the prevention or
minimization of pollution damage. 31 The definition of oil pollution dam-
age has been criticized as vague because only personal injuries are cov-
ered under the Convention, while there is no specification for the type
and scope of other damages.3 2
To some extent the 1984 Convention has remedied the shortcomings
of the 1969 Convention's definition of oil pollution damage. The 1984
Convention establishes that compensation should cover not only personal
injuries, but also include property damages and loss of profit.3 Claims for
compensation for impairment of the environment are limited to the cost
of reasonable measures actually undertaken or measures to be undertaken
for reinstatement of the environment.34 The Convention does not provide
details on causation, which damages are considered remote, or informa-
tion on how to quantify damages such as loss of future earnings.3 5 In-
stead, the Convention leaves this task to national courts. Yet, lack of de-
tails on causation and quantification should not be conceived as a
shortcoming of the Convention. 6 Until sufficient national legislation is
passed, case-by-case adjudication can address these details better than
general treaty provisions. International conventions have to maintain a
certain level of flexibility in order to accommodate future developments.
Another innovation of the 1984 Convention is that it establishes lia-
bility not only for occurrences resulting in pollution damage but also oc-
currences creating "a grave and imminent threat of causing such dam-
age." Plaintiffs can now be compensated not only for preventive
measures after pollution has occurred but also for measures taken to
avert threats of pollution.
The geographical scope of the 1984 Convention includes the exclusive
economic zone as well as the territory and the territorial sea of the con-
28. 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
29. Id. art. 1(6).
30. Id.
31. Id. art. 1(7).
32. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 209.
33. Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 2(3). See also ABE-
CASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 237-38.
34. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 237-38.
35. Id.
36. But see id. at 209, 239.
37. Compare 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(8) with Protocol of 1984 to Amend
1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 2(4).
VOL. 22:1
TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
tracting states.38 Liability is channelled to the owner, but other people
that perform services for the ship such as the manager, charterer, or oper-
ator of the ship 9 can be held liable if the damage resulted from a reckless
or intentional act or omission and with knowledge that such damage
would probably result. As mentioned above, the term "recklessly" pro-
vides courts with ample discretion to hold these persons liable. The Con-
vention does not provide for liability of the builder or the repairer of the
ship, but the builder or repairer may be held liable under domestic law.4 0
One of the priorities of 1984 Convention was to raise the liability
limits of the 1969 Convention. The liability ceilings adopted were consid-
ered too high by some states and therefore the final draft of the Conven-
tion was adopted with many abstentions.4 ' The procedure for revising the
liability ceilings adopted in the 1984 Convention does not-require a Con-
ference, as did the 1969 Convention.42 The 1984 Convention merely re-
quires an amendment adopted by the Legal Committee of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO). The amendment is considered
accepted within eighteen months after notification to all state parties, un-
less a quarter of the state parties object.4 Industry's preoccupation with
the repercussions of liability on insurance is evident: state parties will
consider the potential increase in insurance costs when contemplating any
revision of the liability ceiling.4
The 1971 Fund Convention supplements the 1969 Liability Conven-
tion and provides for compensation of victims of pollution "5 and for in-
demnification of the owner held liable under the Liability Convention.46
Indemnification of the shipowner was excessively debated during the
drafting of the Convention because of the conflict of interests between
states with shipping industry and oil receiving states that finance the
Fund.47 Finally, the indemnification provision was abolished in the 1984
38. Compare 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. II with Protocol of 1984 to Amend
1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
39. According to article 4(2) of the Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra
note 7, these people include the following: the servants or agents of the owner or the mem-
bers of the crew; the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew,
performs services for the ship; any person performing salvage operations with the consent of
the owner or on the instructions of a competent public authority; any person taking preven-
tive measures; and all servants or agents of persons mentioned above.
40. A3ECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 233.
41. Id. at 240. According to article 4 of the Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention,
supra note 7, shipowners can limit their liability to the three million SDRs for a ship that
does not exceed five thousand units of tonnage; for a ship with additional tonnage, an addi-
tional 420 million SDRs are required. In any case the amount can not exceed 59.7 million
SDRs.
42. Protocol of 1984 to Amend 1969 Convention, supra note 7, art. 15.
43. Id. art. 15(7).
44. Id. art. 15(5).
45. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(6). The amount of compensation can in
no case exceed 900 million francs or be lower than 450 million francs.
46. Id. art. 5(1).
47. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 261.
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Fund Convention.48
Compensation is provided for pollution damage49 only if the claimant
is unable to obtain full and adequate compensation under the Liability
Convention."0 The claimant can also recover preventive costs as defined
by the Liability Convention." Preventive costs are those costs incurred
from measures undertaken after the oil spill occurred. The 1984 Fund
Convention further improved this definition by providing that the claim-
ant is entitled to compensation for preventive measures taken before the
occurrence of the oil spill.
52
Under the 1971 Fund Convention, the amount of damages to which
the victims are entitled is unrelated to the amount of indemnification
paid to the owner. The provision relating to distribution of Fund re-
sources among claimants is ambiguous.53 The 1984 Fund Convention "
clarified this provision by providing that claims against the Fund should
be treated as a separate group and distributed pro rata disregarding the
extent to which they have been satisfied by the limitation fund of the
Liability Convention. 5 According to Fund practice, the claims covered
under its provisions are restoration of the environment, loss of livelihood,
loss of income, and environmental damage." But claims to recover costs
for environmental damage can be raised only if economic interests are
affected.5 7
48. 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 7.
49. Both the 1969 Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention define pollution
damage in the same terms. See 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(2).
50. The claimant is unable to obtain full and adequate compensation when no liability
for damage arises under the Liability Convention, or when the owner liable under the Lia-
bility Convention is financially incapable of meeting her obligations, or when the damage
exceeds the owner's limitation fund. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(1).
51. See 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(9).
52. 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(3). The 1984 Fund Convention defines
preventive measures as the 1984 Liability Convention does. See id. art. 2(2).
53. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(5):
Where the amount of established claims against the Fund exceeds the aggre-
gate amount of compensation payable under paragraph 4, the amount available
shall be distributed in such manner that the proportion between any estab-
lished claim and the amount of compensation actually recovered by the claim-
ant under the Liability Convention shall be the same for all claimants.
See also ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 270.
54. The 1984 Fund Convention has also raised the liability limits to 135 million SDRs.
See also 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 6(4)(c), which calls for liability limits to
be raised to 200 million SDRs in case state parties to the Convention receive oil equal to 600
million tons. This is because oil-receiving states contribute to the Fund. See infra at 71.
Thus, in practice the limit will be raised only if the United States together with Japan, or
with Italy and France, or with Italy and the Netherlands, participate in the Fund. See UN-
CED, supra note 18, at 34.
55. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 269-70, 295.
56. See generally id. at 274-77.
57. It is difficult to quantify harm to the environment when tangible economic loss or
personal injury is not involved. See Note by the Director General on Claims Relating to
Damage to the Marine Environment, IOPC Fund, Exec. Comm., 30th Sess., Agenda Item 3,
VOL. 22:1
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The Fund's settlement procedure is quite remarkable. The Fund has
developed a Claims Manual that provides a simple procedure for claim
settlement." The Fund has a good working relationship with the Protec-
tion and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs) of shipowners, and claimants can
bring their claims just once to either of these two bodies in order to ob-
tain compensation.59 Subsequently, the Club and the Fund divide the
amount paid to the claimant.60 P&I Clubs are composed of shipowners
who organize to mutually indemnify each other against lawsuits in case of
damage to cargo or injuries to third parties. The Clubs started to operate
in the nineteenth century when underwriters at Lloyd's of London would
cover only three quarters of hull damage."1 Today P&I Clubs cover ninety
percent of the world shipping industry. They provide unlimited coverage
in most cases, except for oil pollution and nuclear incidents.62 P&I Clubs,
while considered a traditional form of insurance, are one of the oldest
forms of alternative insurance.6"
The Fund also provides for prepayment of damages after verifying
that the shipowner is entitled to liability limits under the Liability Con-
vention. To receive prepayment, one must also demonstrate undue finan-
cial hardship on the part of the shipowner."' The Fund additionally pro-
vides for credit facilities to contracting states "in imminent danger of
substantial pollution damage."6 " The 1984 Fund Convention enhanced
these provisions by providing for compensation even if the shipowner has
not yet established a limitation fund. 6
The Fund is financed by entities of states that have received in the
relevant calendar year more than 150,000 metric tons of oil.8 7 Therefore,
states with modest oil imports can become parties to the Fund Conven-
tion, enjoying its full protection, without imposing on the industry to con-
tribute to the Fund.68 Enforcement is left to states, which should make
sure that industry's financial obligation to the Fund are fulfilled and
which should impose sanctions when necessary. 9 The 1984 Fund Conven-
tion additionally provides that states can be held liable if their failure to
police the contributors results in financial loss to the Fund.7 0
FUND/EXC.30/2 (Nov. 29, 1991); see also IOCP Fund Resolution No. 3-Pollution Dam-
age, Annex, FUND/EXC.30/2 (Oct. 1980).
58. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 272.
59. Id. at 272-73 (mentioning the Fund's internal regulations).
60. Id. at 273.
61. BRUCE FARTHING, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 49 (1987).
62. Id.
63. J. Brady Young, High Stakes in the Alternative Market: Non-Traditional Risk-
Financing Techniques, BEST'S REV., Jan. 1992, at 47.
64. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 273.
65. Id.
66. 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 6(5).
67. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 10(1).
68. ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 9, at 278.
69. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 6, art. 13(2).
70. 1984 Fund Convention, supra note 8, art. 16(2).
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In general, the oil pollution regime is very comprehensive, but it has
one important shortcoming: the prescription of limited liability. The in-
adequacy of liability limits is evidenced by their repeated increases after
environmental disasters.' After the Amoco Cadiz disaster, France, a state
party to the 1974 Convention, refused to collect the money deposited in
the limitation fund because of limited liability restraints. Instead, France
brought an action in the United States, the domicile of the ship's builder
and operator."'
Except for the prescription of limited liability, the oil pollution re-
gime provides a model private liability system for environmental acci-
dents with international implications.7 The 1984 Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions clarified many of the provisions of the Conventions they
have amended. They provide explicitly for compensation for economic
loss, and for recovery of expenditures for restoration of the environment.
They also provide for compensation even when the shipowner has not es-
tablished a limitation fund. Because of these progressive provisions, the
Conventions have yet to enter into force. The United States Congress re-
fused to ratify the Conventions, and therefore the prospects of the Con-
ventions ever entering into force are slim."' For this reason the IMO de-
cided to amend the Conventions in order to ease their ratification."
After the Exxon Valdez disaster, the United States enacted legisla-
tion" that not only increased the liability limits for oil pollution77 but
also provided for unlimited liability in many more instances than do the
1971 and 1984 Conventions on Civil Liability. Even before the Oil Pol-
lution Act, United States courts interpreted the Limitation Liability Act
of 18517" broadly. According to the Act, shipowners are not entitled to
limit their liability if the damage occurred due to their privity or knowl-
71. UNCED, supra note 18, at 37-38 (For example, liability limits were increased by
fifty percent after the Amoco Cadiz incident).
72. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978,
954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
73. The success of the Conventions is evidenced by the fact that many countries have
ratified them. For example, since their entry into force, 71 countries have ratified the 1971
Civil Liability Convention, and 47 countries have ratified the 1971 Fund Convention.
74. See supra note 54.
75. Consideration of Draft Protocols with Amendments to the Intergovernmental Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation System Based on the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
and the 1971 Fund Convention and Related Issues, IMO Leg. Comm., 66th Sess., Agenda
Item 9, at 21-24, IMO Doc. LEG 66/9 (Mar. 26, 1992).
76. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1990).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a).
78. Compare 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2) and Protocol of 1984 to Amend
1969 Convention, supra note 7, art 6(2) with 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c), which provides that pol-
luters are not entitled to limited liability in case of gross negligence, willful misconduct or
"violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation" (empha-
sis added). In addition, according to the Oil Pollution Act, polluters are not accorded as
many defenses as under the Civil Liability Convention. Compare 1969 Convention, supra
note 5, art. I(2) with 33 U.S.C. § 2703.
79. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1982).
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edge.80 Courts initially supported Congress' purpose for the Act - to en-
hance the competitiveness of the United States shipping industry, which
was at that time comprised of small shipowners. But during the 1950's
and 1960's, the courts refused to provide the same protection to multina-
tional oil corporations. The courts instead interpreted the statute in favor
of pollution victims. More specifically, the courts started imposing unlim-
ited liability not only when shipowners had actual knowledge of an immi-
nent threat of an accident but also when they should have had knowledge
of such a threat, such as knowledge of the lack of seaworthiness or faulty
condition of the ship. 1 Perhaps the different national courts that will in-
terpret the Liability Convention will follow the same path. As empha-
sized, the explicit provision for unlimited liability when shipowners reck-
lessly cause damage opens the door for such an interpretation.
In practice, the 1971 regime has functioned smoothly with an amica-
ble resolution of most disputes. This is largely due to the fact that oil
spills do not directly affect population centers by causing injuries and
deaths. Oil spills have a more subtle effect on the surrounding marine
environment. A liability regime for transnational waste movements can
build upon many of the provisions of the oil pollution regime.
B. International Liability of the Carriers of Dangerous Goods
The Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Car-
riage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels
(CRTD)8 2 was prepared by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (ECE), but it is opened for signature to other countries.83 The
Convention places strict and limited liability on operators of railway lines
and persons in control of vehicles carrying dangerous goods. 4
In order to facilitate the identification of the liable person, it is pre-
sumed that the person in whose name the vehicle is registered is liable.
When such registration does not exist, the owner will be held liable, un-
less the owner can prove that another person was in control of the vehicle
80. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a).
81. Linda Rosenthal & Carol Raper, Amoco Cadiz and Limitation of Liability for Oil
Spill Pollution: Domestic and International Solutions, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 259,
270-72 (1985).
82. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (ECE), CONVENTION ON CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED DURING CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY ROAD, RAIL OR
INLAND NAVIGATION VESSELS (CRTD), U.N. Doc. ECE/TRANS/84, U.N. Sales No.
E.90.II.E.39 (1990) (including Explanatory Report) [hereinafter CRTD Convention]. The
Convention has not yet come into force.
83. Id. art. 22.
84. Id. art. 1(8). When the vehicle on which the dangerous goods are transported is
carried on another vehicle the operator of that other vehicle will be considered the carrier.
See art. 1(8)(a). When damage has resulted from an incident involving two or more vehicles,
and the damage is inseparable, both carriers will be held jointly and severally liable. See art.
8.
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with or without the owner's consent. 85
The primary concern of the drafters of the treaty was to protect po-
tential victims, while simultaneously minimizing insurance costs. There-
fore, the different solutions proposed by the drafters contemplated both
of those considerations. 6 The possibility of channeling liability to the
owner of goods was excluded because ownership may change many times
during transport, making identification of the owner burdensome.8 7 Chan-
neling responsibility to the producer of goods was also excluded because
the producer has no control over the carriage. Moreover, the carriage may
take place many years after production and, consequently, it would be
unfair to require the producer to keep insurance just in case of an acci-
dent during transportation. Many times dangerous goods are transported
together, and it is difficult to distinguish which producer's goods have
caused the damage.8 Imposing liability on the shipper was additionally
viewed as impractical. The shipper would have to take out insurance for
each and every consignment, and it would be difficult at the time of an
accident to decipher which shipper's substance caused the damage.89
Placing liability on the carrier seemed the most reasonable solution
to most governments since the carrier is in control of the movement of
goods, can be easily identified by the victims, and can purchase insurance
on an annual basis. Carriers fiercely opposed this proposition. They
claimed that accidents occur due to the inherent danger of the goods car-
ried and that imposing liability on the carrier will only increase the cost
of insurance, distort competition, and drive many carriers out of business.
The carriers proposed joint responsibility of carriers and shippers. How-
ever, joint responsibility was rejected because it was considered impracti-
cal to place responsibility on the shipper, and because most governments
considered joint and several liability too complex. Yet recognizing the in-
equities of placing responsibility on the carrier when other persons are
also responsible, the Convention renders the consignor or consignee liable
for accidents caused during loading or unloading without the participa-
tion of the carrier. Joint liability is additionally established when both
the carrier and another person are involved in loading and unloading.90
Except for the reasons mentioned above, persons other than the carrier
are not required to take out insurance. 1
The issue of whether liability should be limited or unlimited was a
source of contention during the drafting of the treaty. It is interesting to
note that a large number of governments favored unlimited liability, ar-
guing that the adoption of unlimited liability in domestic systems has not
85. Id. art. 1(8).
86. Id. at 6, Explanatory Report.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. art. 6.
91. Id. art. 6(2)(a).
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prevented the operation of compulsory insurance.2 As a compromise, lim-
ited liability was adopted,9 3 while it was made clear that governments
may adopt higher limits or unlimited liability.94 The Convention also pro-
vides that when carriers are entitled to limit their liability, they must
establish a limitation fund with the court where an action is brought.95
Carriers are not entitled to limit their liability when the damage is caused
by their intentional or reckless act or omission or by an intentional or
reckless act of their servants and agents. 6
The defenses provided in this Convention are broader than those of
the Oil Pollution Convention. 7 Except for force majeure, carriers cannot
be held liable if they can prove that consignors or other persons did not
fulfill their obligation to inform them about the dangerous nature of
goods. The carriers must also prove that they did not know, or were not
required to know, that the goods carried were dangerous. 8 The carrier is
also exonerated from liability if the damage resulted from an intentional
or negligent act or omission of the victim.9 In case the carrier is not lia-
ble, other persons may be held liable, but many important provisions of
the Convention will not apply to them.'0 0
Following the 1969 Oil Pollution Convention, the CRTD Convention
provides for compulsory insurance.'0 ' The insurance covers not only the
carrier mentioned in the insurance policy, but it also covers any other
person in control of the vehicle at the time of an accident.' 2 The partici-
pants felt that insurance companies would be able to insure carriers, and
92. Id. at 9, Explanatory Report.
93. For the limits of liability, see id. art. 9:
The liability of the road carrier and of the rail carrier under this Convention
for claims arising from any one incident shall be limited as follows: (a) with
respect to claims for loss of life or personal injury: eighteen million units of
account (b) with respect to any other claim: twelve million units of account.
The liability of the carrier by inland navigation vessel under this Convention
for claims arising from any one incident shall be limited as follows: (a) with
respect to claims for loss of life or personal injury: eight million units of ac-
count (b) with respect to any other claim: seven million units of account. See
also id. art. 37, Explanatory Report. The reason for imposing lower liability
limit for inland navigation carriers was the absence of insurance markets for
such carriers, and concerns that small such carriers will not be able to insure
up to the amounts provided for rail and road carriers.
94. Id. art. 24.
95. Id. art. 11.
96. Id. art. 10.
97. Compare 1969 Convention, supra note 5, art. 111(2) with CRTD Convention, supra
note 82, art. 5(4).
98. See also Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by
Road (CMA), May 19, 1956, art. 22, reprinted in 399 U.N.T.S. 189. Servants and agents of a
carrier are exonerated from liability as well unless they acted with intent or with knowledge
that such damage would probably result. See CRTD Convention, supra note 82, art. 5(7).
99. CRTD Convention, supra note 82, art. 5(5).
100. Id. art. 7.
101. Id. art. 13.
102. Id. art. 13(2).
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they believed that, because of the limited amounts of liability, even small
carriers would be able to insure. The insurance companies were in favor
of such a regime. While they claimed that strict liability may initially lead
to an increase in premiums, they maintained that such an increase would
be reassessed by taking into account the number and severity of claims.'0 3
The monitoring of insurance provisions is left to state parties. Each state
party must designate competent authorities that will issue or approve cer-
tificates verifying that the carriers have obtained insurance.10' In order to
speed the settlement of disputes, claims for compensation may be
brought directly against the insurer. No action against the carrier or its
insurer may be brought three years after the victim knew or should have
known of the damage and the identity of the carrier, or ten years after
the incident.105 Actions may be brought in the courts of the state party
where damage occurred, where the incident took place, or where preven-
tive measures were taken. In addition, and contrary to the oil pollution
and nuclear liability regimes, an action may be brought where carriers
have their habitual residence - the state of registration when the ship
entangled in the accident is subject to such registration. 06 Some govern-
ments also proposed the establishment of a fund for use when compensa-
tion exceeds the liability limits, but the proposal did not gain the support
of the majority of governments. It was recognized that the oil importers
sponsoring the oil pollution fund were more readily identifiable than in-
dustries involved with dangerous goods.10 '
The definition of dangerous goods provided by the Convention is
very comprehensive.' 08 The Convention refers to the European Agree-
ment Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road
(ADR),' 09 which contains extensive lists of dangerous substances subject
to frequent updates. This puts carriers on notice about which substances
may entail liability under the Convention. The definition of dangerous
goods is broad enough to include hazardous wastes as long as there is no
specific liability regime for the transfers of hazardous wastes."0
The damages covered under the Convention involve loss of life or
personal injury and loss of or damage to property."" Recovery for pure
economic loss is not explicitly covered by the Convention. It should be
103. Id. at 9, Explanatory Report.
104. Id. art. 14.
105. Id. art. 18.
106. Id. art. 19.
107. Id. at 10, Explanatory Report.
108. Id. art. 1(9).
109. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, EUROPEAN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTER-
NATIONAL CARRIAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY ROAD, U.N. Doc. ECE/TRANS/80, U.N. Sales
No. E.89.VII.2 (including amendments up to January 1990).
110. Basel Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, provides that state parties must adopt a
liability protocol concerning the transfrontier movements of hazardous wastes. See also
supra note 3.
111. CRTD Convention, supra note 82, art. 1(9).
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mentioned, however, that during the drafting, many states resisted ex-
plicit exclusion of pure economic loss and maintained that because na-
tional laws were still evolving such issues must be covered by domestic
legislation. 12 Loss or damage from polluting the environment may also be
recovered provided that compensation for impairment of the environ-
ment, other than loss of profit, is restricted "to costs of reasonable mea-
sures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken." ''1 The
costs of preventive measures and loss or damage caused by preventive
measures must also be covered. " ' Preventive measures, however, are de-
fined as measures taken after an incident has occurred.'1
An advantage of the Convention is that, by subjecting reckless carri-
ers to unlimited liability, it leaves open the possibility for application of
unlimited liability. In addition, the Convention justifiably renders con-
signors liable if they fail to inform carriers about the nature of dangerous
goods. But unfortunately, the Convention does not go far enough. Estab-
lishing limited liability that could be superseded by expansive judicial in-
terpretations or by national laws imposing increased liability limits or un-
limited liability fails to bind states to a uniform liability regime. A fund
sponsored by consignors or consignees seems also necessary since the ag-
gravation of many accidents is due to improper packing or the inherent
nature of dangerous goods. A fund could provide the mechanism through
which persons profiting from the trade in dangerous goods will internalize
the costs resulting from the transportation of such goods.
Yet attempts to impose liability on the shippers of dangerous sub-
stances within the framework of the Draft Convention Concerning the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea"" have been met
with strong resistance from the chemical industry. The chemical industry
claims that liability should lie with the shipowner according to the tradi-
tional rules of maritime law. Another problem is that because many di-
verse industries are involved in the transportation of dangerous goods, it
is difficult to create an effective international body capable of collecting
contributions.
Recent proposals involve the establishment of an "International Dan-
gerous Goods Scheme." Under the initial formulation of the Scheme, each
shipper and shipowner had to purchase a dangerous goods certificate stat-
ing the amount and nature of the cargo, and in which trip it would be
112. Id. at 17-18, Explanatory Report.
113. Id. art.l(9)(c).
114. Id. art. l(9)(d).
115. Id. art. 1(11).
116. 1991 Draft Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Jan. 25, 1991, IMO Doc. LEG. 64/4
[hereinafter HNS Convention]. The Convention has been recently amended. See 1992 Draft
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, Jan. 5, 1993, IMO Doc. LEG 684
[hereinafter HNS Revision].
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transported."' Later in the negotiations, it was decided that only ship-
pers should sponsor the Scheme"' because that was more in line with the
established law and practice initiated by the oil pollution regime. 1 9 The
certificates purchased by shippers will be issued by "issuing agents" -
governments 20 - on behalf of the Scheme.' 2 ' Many problems, however,
emerged in trying to identify the contributions of each industrial sec-
tor. 22 These problems would be difficult to resolve because of the lack of
statistics identifying the rate of involvement of each industrial sector in
accidents. 2 3 The chemical industry has proposed that only shipowners
should participate in the Scheme. According to the chemical industry,
shipowners must incorporate the cost of contributing to the Scheme into
the freight price, and contribute the charge so collected to the Scheme. If
they fail to contribute, they should be refused registration until they
pay. 2 " The proposal of the chemistry industry has been rejected.'2 5
C. The Nuclear Liability Regime
The nuclear liability regime is comprised of three conventions: the
Paris Convention 28 adopted by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the
117. HNS Convention, supra note 116, art. 17.
118. It has been proposed that the term "scheme" should be replaced by the term
"fund." Consideration of a Draft International Convention on Liability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea,
IMO Leg. Comm. 66th Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 9, IMO Doc. LEG. 66/9 (Mar. 26, 1992)
[hereinafter 66th Session Report].
119. HNS Revision, supra note 116, art. 17.
120. Norway has proposed that in addition to issuing agents, voluntary "industry as-
sociations" should be able to issue HNS certificates. According to Norway's proposal, an
industry association may include a trade sector, or part of a trade sector, world-wide or
regional. The members of such associations will have to purchase HNS certificates, but the
associations will have to contribute to the Scheme based on transport statistics. Shippers
will have to reimburse their industry association according to their membership terms. See
Consideration of a Draft International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Dam-
age in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, IMO
Leg. Comm. 67th Sess., Agenda Item 9, Annex 2, at 6, IMO Doc. LEG 67/9 (Oct.13, 1992)
[hereinafter 67th Session Report].
121. HNS Revision, supra note 116, art. 12, 14.
122. 66th Session, supra note 118, Annex 2.
123. 67th Session Report, supra note 120, at 5, 11.
124. Consideration of a Draft International Convention of Liability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea, Submitted by the
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), IMO Legal Comm., 65th Sess., Agenda Item
3, at 2, IMO Doc. LEG. 65/3/8 (Sept. 10, 1991). CEFIC reiterated its position in the 67th
Session Report, supra note 120, at 7.
125. Report of the Group of Technical Experts on the Consideration of a Draft Interna-
tional Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Car-
riage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, IMO Leg. Comm. 67th Sess., Agenda
Item 3, at 8, IMO Doc. LEG 67/WP.7 (Oct. 1, 1992).
126. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960,
1041 U.N.T.S. 358 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),'2 7
the Vienna Convention 2 adopted by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)," 9 and the Brussels Convention, which supplements the
Paris Convention.'"0 State parties to the Paris Convention are not parties
to the Vienna Convention. For this reason, the Joint Protocol Relating to
the Application of the Vienna and Paris Conventions"3 ' provides that a
state party to the Vienna or Paris Conventions and the Protocol can re-
cover damages from the operator of a nuclear facility installed in a state
that is party to either Convention. 2
Both the Paris and the Vienna Conventions impose strict'3 3 and lim-
ited liability on the operator of a nuclear installation 3 4 and joint and sev-
eral liability when more than one operator is liable and the damage is not
reasonably separable. 3 5 Limited liability was considered preferable be-
cause it was protective of the relatively new nuclear energy industry. 36
Channelling liability exclusively to the operator avoided the excessive ad-
ministrative and insurance costs related with inquiries into the liability of
the other actors such as suppliers and transporters."7 The Conventions
127. Seventeen OECD countries have signed the Convention: Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and
United Kingdom.
128. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063
U.N.T.S. 265 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
129. The state parties to the Vienna Convention are as follows: Argentina, Bolivia,
Cameroon, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Hungary, Mexico, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Trini-
dad & Tobago and Yugoslavia. Only Argentina and Yugoslavia are, however, nuclear power
states.
130. Convention Supplementary to the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 956 U.N.T.S. 264 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
131. Joint Protocol Relating to The Application of the Vienna Convention and the
Paris Convention, Sept. 21, 1988, reprinted in 42 NUCLEAR LAW 56 (NEA ed., 1988).
132. All these Conventions are concerned with liability issues regarding peaceful uses of
nuclear power. The only Convention that touches on the military uses of nuclear power has
never entered into force because of the sensitivity of national security issues. See Conven-
tion on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, reprinted in INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVENTIONS ON MARITIME LAW, supra note 6, at 138. The Convention provides for
strict and limited liability of the operators of nuclear ships (art. 2-3). No other person ex-
cept for the operator can be held liable (art. 2). Operators of warships are also held liable
(art. 1(11)).
133. According to Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 9 and Vienna Convention,
supra note 128, art. IV(3), operators are not held liable in cases of force majeure.
134. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 3, 6; Vienna Convention, supra note 128,
art. IV(1), 11(5).
135. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 5(b); Vienna Convention, supra note 128,
art. 11(3).
136. Norbert Pelzer, Concepts of Nuclear Liability Revisited: A Post-Chernobyl As-
sessment of the Paris and the Vienna Conventions, in NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW AFTER
CHERNOBYL 97, 99 (Peter Cameron et al. eds., 1988).
137. Id. at 102. As far as the carriage of nuclear material is concerned both Conventions
impose liability on the operator who sends and the operator who receives the material. See
Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 4; Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. II. See
also Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
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also impose compulsory insurance on the operators of nuclear facilities.
The specification of the amount, type, and terms of such insurance is left
to each state party. 138
-The Conventions apply in cases that involve, inter alia, transporta-
tion and disposal of radioactive wastes.' 9 Nuclear damage under the Con-
ventions comprises loss of life, personal injury, and damage to property.140
It does not include economic loss and loss of future earnings unless the
courts of the competent state so provide.' 4' The Brussels Convention
prescribes a compensation scheme for damages caused by an incident at a
nuclear installation whose operator is liable under the Paris Convention:
a portion is provided by the operator's insurance, another by the installa-
tion state, and the balance by contracting states, according to a special
formula based upon the GNP and the nuclear power of the installation
state.'42 Victims can bring claims under the Conventions only in the
courts of a state where the incident that caused nuclear damage oc-
curred.'4 3 However, under the general rules of private international law,
any state that suffers damage because of a nuclear incident has jurisdic-
tion over such claims, and plaintiffs can engage in forum shopping."
The nuclear liability regime does not address nuclear accidents as
comprehensively as the oil pollution regime does with oil spills. The lia-
bility prescribed is limited, and the liability ceilings are ridiculously
low' 4 5 in light of a disaster such as Chernobyl. In addition, the Conven-
Material, Dec. 17, 1971, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON MARITIME LAW, supra
note 6, at 230. The purpose of the Maritime Carriage Convention is to ensure that operators
of nuclear installations are exclusively liable for damages caused by a nuclear incident dur-
ing the transport of nuclear material. More specifically, article 2 of the Convention provides
that any person who could be held liable, according to international or national law applica-
ble in maritime transportation, is exonerated from such liability if an operator of a nuclear
installation is liable under the Paris or Vienna Convention or national law.
138. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 10; Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art.
VII.
139. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. l(a)(ii), (iv), (v), and art. 8. See also Vienna
Convention, supra note 128, art. I(g), (h), (j), and art. VI(2).
140. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 3.
141. Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art. I(k). See also id. art. VIII; Paris Conven-
tion, supra note 126, art 11.
142. Brussels Convention, supra note 130, art. 3.
143. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 13; Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art.
XI.
144. Pelzer, supra note 136, at 103-04.
145. Under article 7 of the Paris Convention, supra note 126, the liability ceiling is
fifteen million European Monetary Agreement Units of Account. National laws can set lower
liability ceilings after examining the opportunities that operators have to obtain insurance,
but in no case can liability limits be less than five million European Monetary Agreement
Units of Account. Under article III of the Brussels Convention, supra note 130, the liability
ceiling was increased to 120 million European Monetary Agreement Units of Account. The
1982 protocols to the Paris and Brussels Conventions that entered into force in 1988 have
replaced the unit of account with SDRs. The Vienna Convention, supra note 128, does not
set upper liability limits. Under article V(1), it just sets a minimum liability ceiling of five
million dollars.
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tions do not provide mechanisms to update liability limits and to com-
pensate for preventive measures and economic loss as does the 1984 Lia-
bility Convention for Oil Pollution. Moreover, the ten year time frame
within which the plaintiff can bring an action does not take into account
that the effects of exposure to radiation may not appear for decades. Also
there is no international fund to provide for immediate or residual relief
after a nuclear disaster."4 6 In other words, the particular nature of nuclear
accidents makes the nuclear liability regime appear disconnected from re-
ality. Only lately have there been efforts to update the conventions and
specify their liability limits. The revision process requires close coopera-
tion between OECD and IAEA."47
II. DOMESTIC SYSTEMS OF LIABILITY: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. CERCLA and the Price-Anderson Act: Evidence of Linkage Between
Liability and Insurance?
This section analyzes United States legislation concerning the liabil-
ity of generators, transporters and disposers of hazardous wastes, and op-
erators of nuclear plants. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 4 s governs the liability of
hazardous waste generators, transporters, and disposers concerning the
clean-up of hazardous waste sites. Yet the statute does not deal with per-
sonal injuries caused by hazardous waste sites. CERCLA represents a
vivid illustration of the tensions surrounding the subject of liability and
insurance. The same tensions are apparent in the Price-Anderson Act,149
the statute governing nuclear liability.
1. CERCLA
While the Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)' 50 sets
the standards for waste disposal, CERCLA prescribes strict, unlimited,
and retroactive'"' liability for actors involved in waste management.
CERCLA also creates an 8.5 billion dollar fund, the Hazardous Substance
146. Paris Convention, supra note 126, art. 8; Vienna Convention, supra note 128, art.
VI(1).
147. UNCED, supra note 18, at 17.
148. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
was amended by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act in 1986 (SARA). Both
these Acts are referred to as CERCLA or as CERCLA as amended by SARA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1986).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210-2214 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990).
150. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(k)
(1982 & Supp. I 1984).
151. Retroactive liability extends liability to past mismanagement of hazardous wastes
when no regulations regarding sound disposal were existing. See, e.g., United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Inc. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Superfund, to clean up hazardous waste disposal sites.5 2 The Superfund
is financed by taxes on chemical and oil importing companies and by
taxes on general revenues. It is frequently replenished because each time
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cleans a hazardous waste
site it recovers its expenditures from private responsible parties. " Many
times, however, the discovery and apportionment of liability among re-
sponsible parties entail time-consuming and very expensive settlement 1 "
and litigation procedures with hundreds of parties involved. 55
Under CERCLA, four categories of persons are strictly liable for re-
leases or threatened releases of hazardous waste from a disposal facility:
the current owner of a disposal facility, the owner or operator of a facility
at the time of disposal, 56 the generators of hazardous wastes disposed of
at a facility, and the transporters of hazardous wastes.5 7 Their liability
includes all costs of removal or remedial action at hazardous waste sites "5 8
incurred by the federal or state government and all other necessary costs
of response assumed by any other person. The costs of removal and reme-
dial action must be consistent with the National Contingency Plan
(NCP)."5 9 Liability also includes all damages resulting from the destruc-
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (this section specifies that the government can enter into a Con-
sent Decree according to which Potential Responsible Parties (PRPs) have to reimburse it
for response costs incurred or under which the PRPs agree to undertake response measures
themselves. In extraordinary circumstances, these settlement agreements may include a cov-
enant not to sue the PRPs).
155. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA), COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS
CAN BE SOLVED 28-29 (1989).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). The term "owner or operator" according to the act
does not include "a person, who, without participating in the management of a ... facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the facility." Despite
this provision, courts have held lenders liable under the act. In United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. 573. (D. Md. 1986), the court found a foreclosing lender
liable under the act. But see United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985), holding lenders that foreclosed not liable because they did
not participate in the operation of the facility but only in the financial decisions. But see
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F. 2d 1550, 1557-8 (11th Cir. 1990), holding:
JI]t is not necessary for the secured creditor actually to involve itself in the
day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable ... [n]or is it neces-
sary for the secured creditor to participate in management decisions relating to
hazardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement
with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the infer-
ence that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose.
See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F. 2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985), holding a stock-
holder and corporate officer individually liable for the continuing release of hazardous
wastes. The security interest exemption was not applicable because the stockholder as a
corporate officer had participated in the management of the facility.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
158. Removal costs cover the short-term responses in cases of emergency at a disposal
site. Remedial costs are the long-term clean-up costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(D)(23), (24).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 9605. The NCP establishes procedures and standards for responding
to releases of hazardous substances. The EPA is required to employ a hazard ranking sys-
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tion or injury of national resources.' 60 Consequently, liability under CER-
CLA covers damage to property and to the environment but not personal
injuries.'"" Liability under CERCLA can be characterized as absolute due
to the fact that the defenses provided are very limited.' 6 Furthermore,
the courts take an expansive approach interpreting those defenses. Ac-
cording to the interpretation of the courts, the government's burden of
proof entails the following: the existence of a "facility;" a release of haz-
ardous wastes from the facility; and a defendant that can be one of the
persons - generator, transporter, owner, or disposer - that can be held
liable under CERCLA.6 3 The courts also have imposed joint and several
liability on defendants when the harm caused is indivisible.164 This is the
case in most hazardous waste disposal sites where, because drums are
crowded together, it is virtually impossible to identify the extent to which
a particular defendant has contributed to the contamination of the sur-
rounding environment and groundwater.
The RCRA provides for compulsory insurance of owners and opera-
tors of hazardous waste facilities'66 during the time of operation and
thirty years subsequent to the facility closure. The insurance must cover
all property damage and personal injury claims resulting from sudden ac-
cidental occurrences and non-sudden accidental occurrences.'66 In case in-
surance is not available, letters of credit, surety bonds, trust funds, corpo-
rate guarantees, or self-insurance can be used to demonstrate financial
accountability.' 7
ten in determining the facilities to be added to the National Priority List.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
161. Despite the fact that the statute does not cover personal injuries, certain courts
have allowed medical monitoring damages to be recovered as response costs. See, e.g.,
Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). See also Keister v. Vertac Chemical
Corp., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,677 (E.D. Ark. 1990).
162. In order not to be held liable, the defendant should establish by preponderance of
evidence that the release or threat of release was a result of an act of God, an act of war, or
an act or omission of a party with which the defendant had a contractual relationship other
than an employee or agent of the defendant. In the latter case, the defendant has to prove
that she exercised due care, and that she took precautions against foreseeable acts or omis-
sions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
163. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 616
(1990).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985).
165. RCRA § 3004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6924. The RCRA concerns active waste facilities and
not abandoned waste sites. However, the RCRA provides for corrective action for releases of
hazardous waste constituents from disposal facilities independent of the time wastes were
placed at the facility. See RCRA § 3004(u), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u). Also, the EPA is author-
ized under the RCRA to issue an order or bring an action against past and present waste
generators, transporters, and disposers involved in facilities that may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health and the environment. See RCRA § 7003(a), 42
U.S.C. § 6973(a).
166. 40 C.F.R. § 264.147(a)-(b).
167. Id. § 264.147(a)-(b), (f), (g).
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2. The Causes and Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis
By the mid to late 1980's, the imposition of strict and retroactive
liability, and joint and several liability, in combination with an excessive
number of environmental claims led many insurance companies to with-
draw comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies, covering both acci-
dental and gradual environmental harm.16 8 Instead, the insurance compa-
nies started providing insurance only for one year, and only for sudden
pollution arising out of an incident during that year. 169 In this manner,
the insurance companies hoped to evade liability for the past mishaps of
their policy holders. In most cases, however, courts interpreted the letter
of insurance contracts broadly and held insurers liable for all types of
pollution, sudden as well as gradual, as long as the harm was not inten-
tional.'7 0 The uncertainty created by the broad judicial interpretation of
insurance contracts rendered insurance virtually unavailable.' 7 ' However,
it was not only insurance availability for hazardous waste that declined.
Simultaneously, insurance premiums for medical malpractice and prod-
ucts liability soared.'72 As a result, corporations were forced to self-insure
through "industry wide mutuals"' " or "go bare," that is, operate without
any insurance."7 4
The insurance crisis has provoked severe criticism of the tort system,
but critics do not attribute the insurance crisis to the doctrine of strict
and unlimited liability. Instead, they maintain that the insurance crisis is
rooted in the uncertainty created by the broad interpretation of insurance
policies by courts. ' 5 Critics claim that courts have failed to distinguish
between liability levels that deter irresponsible corporate behavior by
forcing industry to engage in prevention and high liability levels that do
168. ANDERSON, supra note 163, at 610.
169. Id. at 611.
170. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 963-73 (1988).
171. See id. at 944. See also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS
WASTES: THE COST AND AVAILABILITY OF POLLUTION INSURANCE 4 (GAO/PEMD-89-6 1988).
172. Some commentators have attributed the insurance crisis to the alteration of hard
and soft markets that are characteristic of the insurance industry. According to this view,
limiting liability or caps on awards will not alter insurance availability. See, e.g., Linda Lip-
sen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue, in TORT LAW AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 247 (Peter Schuck ed., 1991) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST].
173. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L. J. 1521, 1570, 1577 (1987) (Priest calls the mutuals created because of unavailability
of insurance, for example, in the area of hazardous waste and railroad transportation as
high-risk mutuals. On the contrary, "low-risk mutuals are formed because their members
find being pooled with the high-risk more costly than its worth.").
174. Frank Sommerfield, Going Bare, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1990, at 99.
Uninsured companies are coping with the situation simply by trying to make
their internal environmental controls failsafe. Although some say they are self-
insuring, they usually mean that they feel their cash flow is strong enough to
charge damages to profits, not that they are reserving against potential losses.
175. See, e.g., KIP VIscusI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 28, 50 (1991).
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not deter,170 render insurance unavailable, drive useful companies out of
the market, hamper innovation 1 77 and international competitiveness,1 7 8
and possibly spur illegal practices.' 79 In other words, critics do not blame
the insurance crisis on the doctrine of unlimitied liability per se. Rather,
they blame the interpretation by U.S. courts that awarded large amounts
of compensatory and punitive damages, increasing uncertainty in the in-
surance market.
According to the critics of the tort system, because strict and unlim-
ited liability is not at the source of the insurance crisis, its abolition can-
not be the remedy. Therefore, state statutes that attempt to set limits on
liability, or reinstate the fault principle are bound to fail to relieve the
uncertainty of the insurance market. 80 In addition, liability limits for
each type of injury would be extremely inflexible and would make it diffi-
cult to consider the particularities of individual cases. Even the most ve-
hement critics of the tort system consider liability ceilings "desperate re-
sponses impelled by juridical inflation that has exceeded all bounds that
private insurance can accommodate.' ' 81
In fact, state efforts to stimulate the insurance market in response to
the insurance crisis by establishing caps on liability awards have not sig-
nificantly affected the availability of insurance. For example, empirical
studies have demonstrated that measures to limit liability, such as caps
on awards or granting immunities to defendants, have reduced insurance
costs in medical malpractice cases. 1' But in the case of general liability,
176. See Priest, supra note 173, at 1538.
[T]he economic effects of steadily increasing provider liability thus are quite
simple in structure. A liability rule can compel providers of products and ser-
vices to make investments that reduce the accident rate up to the level of opti-
mal (cost-effective) investments. After providers have invested optimally in
prevention, however, any further assignment of liability affects only the provi-
sion of insurance.
177. Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in LIABILITY MAZE 16 (Peter W.
Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991)[hereinafter LIABILITY MAZE]:
[statistical analysis has] found that for industries with relatively low liability
costs the liability system appeared, if anything, to enhance innovation. But iri
industries such as general aviation, in which liability costs rose sharply during
the early 1980s and became a significant share of total costs, liability does seem
to have dampened innovation.
178. Douglas Besharov, Forum Shopping and Forum Skipping, and the Problem of
International Competitiveness, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 139 (Walter K. Olson
ed., 1988).
179. PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 165
(1988)("[P]roviders who are illegal, anonymous, or too small to bother with also gain a com-
petitive edge over established and reputable providers every time the liability vise is
tightened.").
180. Priest, supra note 173, at 1532-4. See also Abraham, supra note 170, at 976.
181. HUBER, supra note 179, at 202.
182. Glenn Blackmonn & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assess-
ing Our Control of Risks, in PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 172, at 272, 279; Michael J. Tre-
bilcock et. al., Malpractice Liability: A Crosscultural Perspective, in PUBLIC INTEREST,
supra note 172, at 207, 217 (caps on awards reduced claims severity by about twenty-three
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it is not caps, but restrictions on noneconomic and punitive damages and
modifications of the joint and several liability doctrine that have reduced
insurance costs. 8 3 The fact that limits on liability have affected malprac-
tice insurance, but not general insurance, has been attributed to the fact
that malpractice insurance crisis was a crisis of price, while the general
liability insurance crisis was a crisis of availability. 84
Moreover, in the empirical studies mentioned above, for both medical
malpractice and general liability, reduction of insurance costs does not
always result in an actual decrease of insurance premiums. Rather, it re-
sults in less dramatic increases of insurance premiums in states where
tort reform has been enacted.18 The inability of statutory tort reform to
induce an actual decrease of insurance premiums has been attributed to
the insurers' conviction that the success of statutory reforms depends on
judicial interpretation.8 '
Additionally, predictions that the tort system would harm innovation
and the competitiveness of American industry in international markets
have not proven true. The performance of the United States chemical
industry in international markets has not been affected by the allegedly
excessive liability costs. 8 7 On the contrary, the American chemical indus-
try is much more innovative8 8 than Japanese and Western European
chemical industries.8 ' Products liability does not appear to preoccupy
American corporate executives as much as do the general economic envi-
ronment, taxation, the stigmatizing effects of punitive damages, and haz-
percent).
183. Blackmonn & Zeckhauser, supra note 182, at 277 (the authors do not make clear
what kinds of insurance are included in the broad category "general liability insurance."
The study makes it difficult to identify what exact type of reform caused what reduction of
insurance costs. This is because it frequently includes similar, but not identical tort reforms
under one general category).
184. Patricia Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the Other Side Greener,
in PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 172, at 176, 180.
185. Blackmonn & Zeckhauser, supra note 182, at 287.
186. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, in PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 172, at 151, 158.
187. Rollin B. Johnson, The Impact of Liability on Innovation in the Chemical Indus-
try, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 428, 431-34:
[Alccording to a recent report, "while the U.S. has posted massive overall trade
deficits for many years, this country's chemical trade surplus reflects the tech-
nology, research and marketing expertise that give the industry competitive
advantage in many high valued products." The report goes on to say that
American chemical companies are very attractive to foreign investment ... and
that foreign chemical companies view the American market as the biggest and
most promising for chemical products.
188. In other industries like pharmaceuticals and industries that produce small air-
crafts, liability has dampened innovation. See, e.g., Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of
Product Liabiiity on New Drug Development, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 334;
Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege, in LIABILITY
MAZE, supra note 177, at 478.
189. See Johnson, supra note 187, at 433.
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ardous waste regulations. '10 However, even in the area of hazardous
wastes, the chemical industry has started to realize that the regulatory
and liability rules of hazardous waste management will provide it with a
competitive advantage over other industries that have little experience
with handling chemical substances.' Fluor, for instance, a uranium min-
ing company, uses a modification of its computer program for mining to
determine how to excavate underground contaminants, while removing as
little soil as possible, and how to extract and treat contaminated ground-
water. 92 Betcht is another company that once constructed oil refineries
but now assists in cleaning them up. Betcht was hired by Saudi Arabia to
clean up the Gulf spill.
1 93
It has been determined that the existence of liability or of a particu-
lar standard of liability - strict liability or negligence - does not by
itself influence deterrence. Concerns about reputation and a mix of liabil-
ity and regulatory rules often have more effective deterrent effects.'"
Many times strict liability and regulations have forced industry to invest
in products that are environmentally benign and have fostered industrial
safety and innovation. The efforts of the industry to develop alternatives
to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are well known. After the Bhopal disaster,
certain chemical companies reduced the amount of hazardous chemicals
they store on site or the amounts they use.1 95 Other times, stringent legis-
lation has driven polluting industries out of the market and has spurred
the development of new industries willing to produce safer products or
services."9 "
Despite the chemical industry's increased investment in safety, it has
been estimated that the existing liability system grossly underdeters cor-
porations. For immediately manifested injuries due to chemical exposure,
the overall liability costs of the chemical industry represent no more than
seventy percent of the corresponding social costs.19 For chronic diseases
due to chemical exposure, liability costs represent no more than five per-
cent and often less than one tenth of a percent of the corresponding social
costs."9 The causes of this excessive underdeterrence are, inter alia, the
190. Id. at 435.
191. Id. at 444.
192. Sonni Efron & James M. Gomez, Cleaning-Up on Clean-Ups, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1991, at D1.
193. Id.
194. LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 12. See also Johnson, supra note 187, at 449.
However, while concerns about reputation can influence transnational corporations and
small reputable firms, they cannot influence speculative small enterprises. See BREmN Fiss.
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 242 (1983).
195. Nicholas Ashford & Robert F. Stone, The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and
Innovation, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 367, 400 (the authors mention numerous
examples where industries changed practices because of public outcry after disasters or
more stringent legislation). See also Johnson, supra note 187, at 444.
196. Ashford & Stone, supra note 195, at 417-18.
197. Id. at 417.
198. Id.
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difficulties of identifying chemical exposure and the difficulties of verify-
ing, by preponderance of evidence,' 9 the causal linkage between exposure
and disease when there is a long latency period between exposure and
manifestation of the disease. °0 Even in circumstances where courts have
relaxed the causation standard,2 ' the amount of compensation awarded
is very small.2 °2 What actually preoccupies courts is that relaxing the cau-
sation standard when reliable epidemiological studies do not exist would
over-compensate plaintiffs at the expense of the defendants."2 On the
other hand, denying damages because of lack of epidemiological studies
may undercompensate accident victims given the current absence of sci-
entific knowledge on many hazardous substances and their effects on
humans. Because of the reluctance of courts to relax the causation stan-
dard, and the ensuing blatant underdeterrence of the chemical industry,
it has been claimed that caps on awards will eventually discourage the
creation of safer products and services, 0 " and that tort reform should be
199. In the notorious Agent Orange litigation, the court ruled that the linkage between
exposure and disease must be proven by a probability of greater than fifty percent. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 818 F.2d 145
(2nd Cir. 1987). See also Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 440
S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969). Courts also have refused to grant awards where other synergistic
factors could have contributed to the disease. Gardner v. Hecla Mining Corp., 431 P.2d 794
(Utah 1967). In addition, courts have been reluctant to award damages for increased risk of
future injury because of exposure to harmful substances at waste sites. This is because sci-
ence is not advanced enough to quantify the degree of susceptibility to a future illness due
to chemical exposure. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988); Wilson v. Johns-Mansville, 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Anderson v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D.Mass. 1986).
200. Ashford & Stone, supra note 195, at 414.
201. For example, courts have been willing to award damages for fear of future illness
("cancerphobia") due to present injury from chemical exposure. See Payton v. Abbott Labs,
437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982). Certain courts have even relaxed the standard of "present
injury" and simply demand "present impact" or "reasonable fear" of developing a disease,
Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, 660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich. 1987), or serious emo-
tional distress that is both "severe and debilitating," Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio
1983). Courts also are increasingly willing to grant damages for costs of medical monitoring
when there is a relative increase in the chance that the disease will occur and early diagnosis
will mitigate its effects. See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). See also
In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1990). In awarding dam-
ages courts have relied on medical expert testimony, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736
F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and epidemiological studies, but, for example, courts have re-
jected medical testimony and epidemiological evidence based on animal studies. See In re
"Agent Orange", supra note 199. See also Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d
823 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
202. Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). The district
court granted damages ranging from $50,000 to $250,000. The court of appeals reduced a
$250,000 award to $18,000 and the highest award granted was $72,000.
203. Even commentators supporting probabilistic causation -that courts should rely
on statistical analysis based on the facts of the particular and previous similar exposures -
concede that such an approach may over-compensate or under-compensate pollution vic-
tims. See Glen Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risks, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 786 (1985).
204. Ashford & Stone, supra note 195, at 398.
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oriented more towards expanding rather than limiting liability.1s0*
As demonstrated, the insurance crisis has been attributed to the un-
certainty created by court decisions that have made damage awards un-
predictable rather than to the absence of liability ceilings. Moreover, em-
pirical studies have demonstrated no direct linkage between caps on
liability and insurance availability. Furthermore, the claim that the tort
system grossly underdeters the chemical industry compels reconsideration
of the position that limited liability will boost insurance markets. Today,
after the insurance crisis, while traditional insurance for environmental
damage is still unavailable, industries have started to participate in alter-
native forms of insurance. In fact, alternative insurance is on the rise
worldwide, and it is believed that it will eventually replace traditional
insurance.0 6
The lack of causal linkage between unlimited liability and insurance
availability illustrated by the experience of the U.S. should dissipate con-
cern about establishing an unlimited liability regime at the international
level. This is especially true because of the development of alternative
forms of insurance that may be better suited to cover environmental
harm.
3. The Price-Anderson Act
The experience of the nuclear industry underscores the view that lia-
bility ceilings cannot guarantee insurance availability and financial viabil-
205. Id. at 419.
[T]he recent demands for widespread tort reform ... tend to miss their mark
since significant underdeterrence in the system already exists. Thus proposals
that damage awards be capped, that limitations be placed on pain and suffer-
ing and punitive damages, and that stricter evidence be required for recovery
should be rejected. On the contrary, the revisions of the tort system should
include relaxing the evidentiary requirements for recovery, shifting the basis of
recovery to subclinical effects of chemicals, and establishing clear causes of ac-
tion where evidence of exposure exists in the absence of manifest disease.
Other tort claims may also be entertained, but they must increase the amount
of deterrence in the system, not further weaken the signals sent to the firm.
206. See Alternative Insurance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1992, at 94. Lack of traditional
insurance has created booming international markets for alternative insurance. Companies
increasingly discover that because they know their risks better than insurers, they can bet-
ter insure for risks giving rise to big claims. Rather than paying premiums to traditional
insurance companies, they hire consultants to advise them on how to manage their risks.
Many alternatives to traditional insurance are currently available. One is to pay claims as
they arise. Another is to create reserves by establishing subsidiary companies, the so-called
captives, into which premiums are paid. A third alternative used mostly by small enterprises
is to form mutual insurance companies. Commentators believe that by the year 2000, self-
insurance in the form of captives or mutuals will be the prevailing form of insurance world-
wide. It is estimated that captives all over the world have assets worth twenty-three to
twenty-four billion dollars. Premiums paid to mutuals were estimated to be $270 million by
the end of 1988 and double that amount by the end of 1991. See also Richard M. Page, The
Business of Insurance; Someone Has To Pay; Special Global Report, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES
INSTITUTE, Jan. 1991.
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ity for corporations. The Price-Anderson Act as amended in 198807 pro-
vides for limited liability of operators of commercial nuclear power plants
and completely shields Department of Energy contractors from any form
of liability in the event of a "nuclear incident."20 8 When first enacted, the
act contained a liability ceiling of five hundred million dollars, sixty mil-
lion dollars contributed by private insurance companies and the remain-
ing by public funds.200 This unique arrangement was undoubtedly due to
the United States' eagerness to explore the peaceful and military uses of
nuclear power combined with the reluctance of private insurance compa-
nies to undertake the full costs of compensation in the event of a nuclear
disaster.2 0 The 1988 Amendment of the Act did not eliminate the liabil-
ity limit. Despite the significant setbacks of the nuclear industry and the
termination of the cold war, the liability ceiling remains, although it has
been increased significantly to seven billion dollars.2 11
In spite of the liability ceilings prescribed by the Price-Anderson Act,
insurance for nuclear power plants in traditional insurance markets re-
mains unavailable. Limited liability has been unable to prevent the de-
cline of the nuclear industry.2 12 In the United States, the nuclear industry
is in retreat.21  The fierce public opposition against the construction of
nuclear power plants has annulled any possible incentive provided by
limited liability. Additionally, insurance industries have suggested that
nuclear liability limits discourage demand for liability coverage and that
as long as utilities are protected by liability limits, they do not have in-
centives to purchase more coverage. 21 ' Despite the absence of traditional
207. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210-2214 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of limits on the liability of nuclear power plants. According to the Court,
liability limits
accompanied by an express statutory commitment to 'take whatever action is
deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences
of' a nuclear accident [are] fair and reasonable substitute for the uncertain
recovery of damages of this magnitude from a utility or component manufac-
turer, whose resources might well be exhausted at an early stage.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
208. Nuclear incident is defined as an occurrence including an extraordinary nuclear
occurrence taking place within the United States and causing bodily injury, sickness, dis-
ease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property within or outside
the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e).
210. Dan Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation? The Sixty-
Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (1989).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e); 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b). See also Marcie Rosenthal, Note,
How the Price Anderson Act Failed the Nuclear Industry, 15 COLUM. J. ENVr'L L. 121, 123
(1990).
212. Nuclear's Fall from Favour, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 18.
213. See, e.g., DANIEL BORSON ET AL., A DECADE OF DECLINE (Public Citizen ed. 1989).
See also Nuclear Power: Losing its Charm, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 21 ("In the United
States, where a quarter of the world's nuclear plants operate, no new plant has been ordered
without subsequently being canceled, since 1974.").
214. Dan R. Anderson, The Dangers of Nuclear Liability Limits, BEST'S REVIEW 12
(Property-Casualty Insurance ed., Mar. 18, 1987).
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insurance for nuclear power plants, the nuclear industry has been able to
secure coverage through alternative forms of insurance, such as insurance
pools and mutuals.1 5 Today nuclear plant operators are able to obtain
over two billion dollars per reactor in coverage.2 1
6
B. The Draft Waste Liability Directive and the European Insurance
Market
The Commission of the European Community, following in the steps
of the United States, has proposed strict and unlimited liability for actors
involved in hazardous waste activities21 7 According to the Commission,
strict liability for environmental harm is becoming increasingly prevalent
in both international2 8 and domestic law.21 9 The purpose of the Directive
is to establish a uniform liability system within the European Community
in order to ensure that a product's price reflects the full costs of its pro-
duction, including the costs of environmental damage.2 The proposed
Directive, however, differs from CERCLA in that it does not explicitly
address the problem of abandoned waste sites and covers personal injury
cases. In contrast to CERCLA, it explicitly incorporates a cost-benefit
analysis for estimating which damages should be recovered for cleaning
up the environment.
The Directive imposes strict, unlimited,22" ' and joint and several lia-
bility222 on the "producer of wastes." '223 For the purposes of the Directive,
215. Three insurance pools provide insurance for the nuclear industry: American Nu-
clear Insurers (ANI) (pool of 90 member insurance companies, insuring one-half of 110 nu-
clear plants), Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters (MAELU), and MAELRP Re-
insurance Association which reinsures 100% of the MAELU policies. Utility companies have
also formed mutuals: Nuclear Mutual Ltd. and Nuclear Electric Insurance Ltd. See Christo-
pher Dauer, AN! Unveils New Nuclear Power Covers, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER COM-
PANY, May 13, 1991, at 23. See also Mercedes M. Perez, Nuclear Energy Touted as Long-
Term Option, BEST'S REV. 112 (Property-Casualty Insurance ed., May 1989); NUCLEONICS
WEEK, April 6, 1990, at 12.
216. This is a significant increase in comparison with $300 million insurance coverage
used to be provided in 1979 when the Three Mile accident occurred.
217. Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste,
COM(89)282 final [hereinafter Proposal]. It was further amended by COM(91)219 final
[hereinafter Amendment].
218. See Proposal, supra note 217, at 2 (the Commission refers to the products liability
Directive, the international conventions on nuclear energy and oil pollution, and the draft
convention on compensation for damage caused by the carriage of dangerous goods by rail,
road or inland waterway).
219. Id.
[Tihe same trend is becoming increasingly established in national legislation.
Germany and Belgium have already introduced the principle of no-fault liabil-
ity. In France, it is well established by case law. Case law in the Netherlands is
moving in the same direction, and the law is being drafted to introduce the
principle in the new Civil Code. In Spain, strict liability has been introduced in
the waste management sector.
220. See Proposal, supra note 217, at 1.
221. Amendment, supra note 217, art. 8.
222. Id. art. 5.
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producers of wastes are considered those persons who import wastes into
the European Community from non-Community countries,"' waste dis-
posers, 2 5 and persons in control of wastes when they cannot identify the
producer.2 " In the latter case, producers are held liable only for a limited
amount if the incident that caused the damage falls within the scope of
the liability Convention concerning the carriage of dangerous goods.22'
The Directive does not specify whether generators that transport their
wastes to a permitted disposal facility are still be held liable.
Damages under the Directive include harm resulting from death or
physical injury, and damage to property.22 8 Plaintiffs can bring an action
against -polluters under national law. National law also determines
whether lost profits may be recovered and who may bring an action in the
event of impairment of the environment.229 In the latter case, plaintiffs
can claim compensation for costs to prevent impairment to the environ-
ment, for costs to restore the environment, and for damage caused by
preventive measures. The entitlement to compensation, however, is sub-
ject to a cost-benefit analysis: there is no entitlement to compensation
when the costs of restoration substantially exceed the benefits or if sub-
stantially cheaper restoration measures are available.22 Impairment to
the environment is defined as significant physical, chemical, or biological
deterioration of the environment.
23
'
Despite the claims of the Commission that the purpose of the Direc-
tive is to establish a uniform liability system, the precise remedy28 2 and
the standard of proof22 3 are left to national legislation. The Directive also
223. A producer of wastes is anyone who in the course of commercial or industrial ac-
tivity produces wastes and anyone who engages in processing, mixing, or other operations
resulting in a change of the nature or composition of waste. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
224. Importers are not held liable when wastes were previously exported from the Com-
munity and their nature or composition were not substantially changed prior to reimporta-
tion. Id. art. 2(2)(a).
225. Id. art. 2(2)(c).
226. Id. art. 2(2)(b).
227. Id. art. 3(1). See also supra Section I(B).
228. Id. art. 2(1)(c).
229. Id. art. 4(1)(a).
230. Id. art. 4(2).
231. Id. art. 2(1)(d).
232. Id. art. 4(1)(b).
The national laws of the Member States shall determine ... the remedies
available to [plaintiffs] which shall include: (i) an injunction prohibiting the
act or correcting the omission that has caused or may cause the damage and/or
compensation for the damage suffered; (ii) an injunction prohibiting the act or
correcting the omission that has caused or may cause impairment of the envi-
ronment; (iii) an injunction ordering the reinstatement of the environment
and/or ordering the execution of preventive measures and the reimbursement
of costs lawfully incurred in reinstating the environment and in taking preven-
tive measures (including costs of damage caused by preventive measures).
233. See Id. art. 4(1)(c). But see Proposal, supra note 217, art. 4(6). It was provided
that a plaintiff should show "overwhelming probability of the causal relationship between
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provides that, in addition to pollution victims and public authorities,
non-governmental organizations can bring action against polluters under
conditions specified by domestic legislation.""
Polluters are exempt from liability only when they can prove that the
damage or injury to the environment was the result of force majeure2 3 5 or
the result of an intentional act or omission of a third party. 6 Their lia-
bility can also be reduced or totally abolished when the damage is caused
in part by the injured party. 3 7 Finally, waste disposers are exempt from
liability if they can prove that they were not negligent and that the pro-
ducer failed to fully disclose information regarding the nature of the
wastes.238
The scope of the Directive includes hazardous and non-hazardous
wastes2"' but not nuclear wastes.14 0 The Directive does not distinguish be-
tween recyclable and non-recyclable wastes. The Economic and Social
Committee has praised the Commission for including recyclable wastes in
the definition of wastes.24 1 The Economic and Social Committee has also
recommended that carriers should be able to use a distinctive sign to in-
the producer's wastes and the damage ... or the injury to the environment suffered."
234. Amendment, supra note 217, art. 4(3). The 1989 version of the proposed directive
provided that public-interest groups could bring an action only if national law so provided.
See also Proposal, supra note 217, art. 4(4).
235. Amendment, supra note 217, art. 6(1)(b).
236. Id. art. 6(1)(a).
237. Id. art. 7(2).
238. Id. art. 7(1).
239. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
240. The justification is that there already exist international conventions prescribing
liability for activities involving nuclear wastes. Proposal, supra note 217, at 2. Most Euro-
pean countries have signed the Paris Convention. However, international regulation of other
issues has not prevented the Commission from proposing appropriate legislation. In addi-
tion, the Paris Convention has many inadequacies that could be addressed by European
Community legislation.
The reluctance of the Commission to regulate radioactive wastes stems from the Euro-
pean Community's support for nuclear energy. This position is reflected in the Euratom
Treaty, which is more preoccupied with facilitating the development of nuclear industry
than with establishing safeguards for the operation of nuclear power plants or for the dispo-
sal of radioactive wastes. As a result, the Commission has adopted a position of non-inter-
vention in domestic nuclear energy programs. See, e.g., Leigh Hancher, 1992 and Accounta-
bility Gaps: The Transnuklear Scandal: A Case Study in European Regulation, 53 MOD. L.
REV. 669 (1990). The lack of genuine supervision and the absence of safeguards for the mili-
tary uses of nuclear power has left radioactive waste management unregulated and has cor-
rupted the nuclear energy industry. The nuclear industry has been frequently involved in
illegal transfers of radioactive materials and wastes. After the Transnuklear scandal that
involved illegal waste exports to Belgium, Transnuklear, the private company entangled in
the scandal was dissolved. It was replaced by a government company that soon started to
engage in illegal waste transfers as well. Nuclear Energy: West Germany Confirms Irregular-
ities in Transport of Nuclear Material, European Report, No. 1555, Jan. 15, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
241. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage
Caused by Waste, CES(90)215.
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dicate whether the wastes they carry are for recycling or final disposal.24 2
Finally, the Committee has suggested that waste carriers should be held
primarily liable because of the difficulty victims will encounter in identi-
fying the producer before the expiration of the statute of limitations.2 43
The Commission has yet to include this recommendation in the amended
Directive.24
4
The Directive provides for compulsory insurance of waste generators
and disposers2 45 and also provides that the Commission will study the
feasibility of establishing a "European Fund for Compensation for Dam-
age and Impairment of the Environment Caused by Waste."2 The impo-
sition of compulsory insurance has intensified the insurance industry's
opposition to the Directive.2 47 The insurance industry fears that the
vague language of the Directive could be interpreted broadly to include
liability for past misdeeds and compulsory insurance for both accidental
and gradual pollution.24 In other words, it fears the creation of a type of
liability scheme believed to be responsible for the litigation and insurance
crises in the United States. Nevertheless, the fear that the United States
precedent will be repeated in the European Community is unfounded.
This is due to the differences between the legal systems of European
Community countries and the United States. The rules of civil procedure
of many European countries often compel the losing party to pay the le-
gal costs of the winning party. Most European systems also do not pro-
vide for jury trials, broad discovery, and noneconomic and punitive dam-
ages. Thus, even if the final formulation of the waste Directive contains
language similar to that of the United States tort doctrine, it does not
follow that its implementation will spur litigation or that it will affect the
availability of insurance. 2 9 In fact, it has been suggested that precisely
because of the legal-systems of the Community and aversion to confronta-
tion, Europeans will not resort to litigation to resolve their disputes.2 50
242. Id.
243. Id. A plaintiff can bring an action within three years from the date the damage or
injury to the environment occurred. See Amendment, supra note 217, art. 9. The right to
compensation expires after thirty years. See Amendment, supra note 217, art. 10.
244. See Amendment, supra note 217.
245. Amendment, supra note 217, art. 11(1).
246. Id. art. 11(2).
247. Gavin Souter, E.C. Insurers to Scramble to Avoid Clean-Up Liability, BUSINESS
INSURANCE, Oct. 21, 1991, at 30.
248. Id. See also Roger Scotton, European Marketplace Faces Crisis: Insurer, Busi-
NESS INSURANCE, June 10, 1991, at 44.
249. Gary T. Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative
Context, in LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 28 (the author emphasizes that differences in
doctrine cannot explain why significantly more suits are brought in the United States than
in Europe, Japan or Canada because these countries have doctrines similar to the United
States liability doctrines. He demonstrates that jury trials, liberal rules of discovery, contin-
gency fees, and punitive damages make the United States tort system more unpredictable
and costly).
250. R. Patrick Thomas, "New" Europe is Years Away; Cultural Traditions, Not E.C.
Directives, Shape Risk Functions, BUSINESS INSURANCE, May 27, 1991, at 27.
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An additional indication that the European Community is unlikely to
experience an insurance crisis is that in Europe insurance contracts pro-
viding for sudden and accidental pollution have been interpreted nar-
rowly and have not been the subject of extensive litigation.2 51 Despite the
narrow interpretation of insurance contracts, British insurers have been
reluctant to provide pollution coverage. However, insurance is readily
available from Swiss and American insurers who claim to make significant
profits from environmental premiums.2 52 In other parts of Europe strict
liability and environmental regulations have intensified the trend toward
alternative types of insurance through captives or mutuals.25 3
III. THE LIABILITY REGIME FOR THE TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF
HAZARDOUS AND RADIOACTIVE WASTES
Before prescribing the elements of a private liability system for
transnational waste movements, it is necessary to examine the potential
functions of such a system and whether it can be successfully replaced by
more efficient and fairer systems. Such systems could include an interna-
tional social insurance system that would be in the form of a government-
sponsored international fund.
A. The Theoretical Debate
In the 1920's and 1930's, workers' compensation statutes gradually
replaced the tort system of the United States and Europe.2 ' At that time,
there was significant debate in academic circles as to whether enterprise
liability should replace the fault principle in torts.2 55 This debate was re-
flected in court decisions that began shifting the burden of proof from
plaintiffs to defendants. Under the fault principle, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant caused the harm, thus the costs of accidents are
more likely to be borne by the plaintiff. Under an enterprise liability sys-
tem, the defendant carries the burden of proof, and the costs of accidents
are more likely to be imposed on the defendant. The movement favoring
251. Id.
252. Green Insurance: Missing Market, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 94.
253. See, e.g., Wilhelm Zeller, European Solutions to EIL Coverage; Environmental
Impairment Liability Insurance, A.M. BEST COMPANY INC. 14 (Property-Casualty Insurance
Edition, March 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; but see also Carolyn
Aldred, Pollution Crackdown in Europe; EIL Insurance Increasingly Scare, BUSINESS IN-
SURANCE, Oct. 8, 1990, at 35, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (mentioning a
French insurance pool that provides insurance for both accidental and gradual pollution
damage, German general insurance liability policies that provide coverage for bodily injury
resulting from both sudden and accidental as well as gradual pollution, and a Swedish insur-
ance consortium that has created a fund to indemnify third parties for pollution caused by
insolvent or unknown polluters).
254. See generally Lawrence Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law
of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
255. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 3, 4 (1970) (citing extensive related
literature in the United States and Europe).
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enterprise liability, as its name indicates, was inspired by indignation
against corporate power and advocated placing liability, irrespective of
fault, on those with "deep-pockets. 2 56 Contemporary proponents of en-
terprise liability urge adoption of strict liability and view the tort system
as a social security mechanism whose primary function is to adequately
compensate accident victims.25 '
The theory of enterprise liability has been enriched by what is called
the "economic theory" of tort law. The economic theory concludes that
"deep-pockets" should bear the cost of accidents, but it bases this conclu-
sion on a different rationale. The primary goal of tort law is not to com-
pensate accident victims but to reduce accident costs. Accident costs can
be reduced by deterring tortfeasors from engaging in accident-prone ac-
tivities. 5 8 However, harmful activities are only deterred if the costs of
accidents exceed the costs of preventing them.2 59 This determination is
left to the cheapest cost-avoider who is the person in the best position to
assess more cheaply the dangers of certain activities.260 Frequently, the
cheapest cost-avoiders are corporate entities or insurance companies that
have or can obtain first-hand information on the safety of products and
services. The public, on the other hand, cannot be the cheapest cost-
avoider because it can easily underestimate the dangers involved.2 6 1 For
this reason, advocates of the economic analysis argue that the costs of
accidents should not be externalized in the form of general taxes because
this would compromise the primary goal of deterrence. 2 2 Accident costs
should be incorporated in the price-system, informing the public on the
safety of products and services.6 8
The two goals of tort law as designated by both enterprise liability
and economic theories - victim compensation and corporate deterrence
- have been criticized as conflicting. Lavish compensation awards may
over-deter corporations, deprive society of valuable services, and impede
innovation.2 " These predictions, however, have not proven true. As ana-
256. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
257. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 5 (1987).
258. CALABRESI, supra note 255, at 16. But see also E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive
Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053 (1989).
259. CALABRESI, supra note 255, at 17.
260. Id. at 164-65.
261. Id. at 55
[F]irst, individuals choosing between insurance and taking their chances often
do not have the data necessary to determine how great the risk is .... Second,
even if individuals had adequate data for evaluating the risk, they would be
psychologically unable to do so . . .people cannot estimate rationally their
chances of suffering death or catastrophic injury.
262. Id. at 143.
263. Id. at 134. However, Calabresi concedes that in real life many decisions are made
politically or collectively without the intervention of the market. This is particularly true
when a decision made through the market would be considered unfair. See id. at 24.
264. For example, in the case of pharmaceuticals and industries that produce small air-
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lyzed above, despite the imposition of enterprise liability, chemical indus-
tries are still underdeterred because it is difficult to establish the causal
link between exposure and disease. 6
Opponents of the tort system also contend that the tort system can-
not deter environmental accidents because such accidents are unforesee-
able events, even for the corporations involved.26 6 They are "normal acci-
dents," or unpredictable outcomes of interactions of complex systems.267
The critics claim that adding safety devices to complex systems will not
necessarily reduce the likelihood of accidents. On the contrary, in many
circumstances, safety devices may stimulate the interactive complexity of
a system, ultimately resulting in more accidents.26 8 This is particularly
evident in nuclear energy production where the potential for unexpected
interactions of trivial failures substantially increases the likelihood of ac-
cidents. 26 9 It is also evident in maritime transportation where naviga-
tional aids have contributed to an increase rather than a reduction of ac-
cidents. Due to high-tech navigational devices, captains feel more in
control of their ships and take greater risks than they normally would if
the technology had not been available.27 The nature of certain accidents
makes the primary goal of corporate deterrence look futile.27' The tort
system as a compensation mechanism has also been criticized for being
too expensive and too ineffective when the advantages of a social security
system are considered.2 72 The advantages of a social security system in-
volve, inter alia, speedy and less costly dispute resolution.27
crafts. See supra note 188; see also HUBER, supra note 179, at 12-15.
265. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
266. See generally RICHARD H. GASKINs, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS: PERSONAL INJURY
AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 59-62 (1989).
267. CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
(1984).
268. Id. at 23.
269. Id. at 60-61.
270. RICHARD PETROW, IN THE WAKE OF TORRY CANYON 206 (1968).
271. GASKINS, supra note 266, at 94.
272. The advantages of the social security system are as follows: "expert" administra-
tive tribunals that deal with similar cases so they can dispose of them relatively quickly; the
lack of adversariness that saves time and money during discovery; and the possibilities of
making provisional assessments of the injury and review them when there is future aggrava-
tion. One of the disadvantages of the social security system is that it is vulnerable to fraudu-
lent claims. See generally PATRICK S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 401-
07, 509-11 (1980); see also Peter Kerr, Vast Amount of Fraud Discovered in Workers' Com-
pensation System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1991, at 1. Even advocates of the economic theory
of law have suggested that the tort system is incapable of dealing with cases of catastrophic
accidents or excessive pollution and that it should be replaced by a social insurance system.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 390 (1991) (Posner suggests that
in cases of catastrophic accidents that cannot be attributed to the negligence of another, a
social insurance system might be preferable).
273. ATIYAH, supra note 272.
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B. An Evaluation of the Debate
1. Liability and Minimum Standards as an Accident Prevention
Mechanism
The first argument of the opponents of the tort system is that envi-
ronmental accidents are inherent in the systems that generate them, and
consequently no one can legitimately be held responsible for the occur-
rence of an accident. Accidents are bound to happen and will happen, as
statistical charts indicate. However, upon closer scrutiny, the picture is
not as bleak as the opponents of the tort system indicate. The systems
that generate accidents are generally capable of improvement. Even the
"normal accident theory" suggests that prevention of accidents depends
on factors such as political will, collective action," 4 and a change in cor-
porate attitude.2" Often a simple change in a decision making procedure
can minimize the frequency and seriousness of accidents. For example, in
the area of marine transportation, replacing the captain with a team of
officers that can check each other's decisions can reduce the likelihood of
accidents.2" Environmental accidents, therefore, are often preventable
and, as demonstrated by the domestic systems analyzed above, strict and
unlimited liability in combination with appropriate international stan-
dards will deter corporate polluters, especially large corporations con-
cerned with their reputation. These standards for the purpose of waste
movements should include standards for land disposal.
277
However, it is highly unlikely that strict and unlimited liability and
land disposal standards will deter smaller hauling companies penetrated
by organized crime 7 . from engaging in illegal waste trafficking.2 9 These
companies are often involved in international illegal waste shipments
such as the illegal waste transfers across the United States-Mexican bor-
der. 28 0 In Europe, organized crime has penetrated waste exports to
274. PERROW, supra note 267, at 172. Perrow attributes the lack of effort to prevent
marine accidents to the fact that victims are unidentifiable, "low status, unorganized or
poorly organized seamen." The same is true for the victims of toxic spills and pollution.
275. In marine transportation corporate pressure to keep to schedules despite the ship's
condition or the weather forecasts is at the source of most accidents. See id. at 118. Such
pressure could certainly be lessened.
276. Id. at 230.
277. It is better to allow waste exports for disposal than prohibit them, and conse-
quently entice industries to engage in illegal dumping. In contrast to oil and other danger-
ous goods, wastes are considered materials without further use, thus industry is always
tempted to illegally dump them. See LOUKA, supra note 1, at 20.
278. For the involvement of organized crime in the United States transportation indus-
try, see MAURICE D. HINCHEY, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY ENVIRONMENTAL
PRESERVATION COMMITTEE, ORGANIZED CRIME'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE WASTE TRANSPORTATION
INDUSTRY (1984). See also MAURICE HINCHEY, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, ILLEGAL DISPOSAL OF WASTES IN THE HUDSON
VALLEY (1991).
279. See FISsE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 194.
280. See Californian Pleads Guilty to Transporting Hazardous Waste to Mexico Ille-
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France 28  and Somalia.282
Even if strict and unlimited liability does not affect the behavior of
companies penetrated by organized crime, it is likely that, in combination
with clear and specific land disposal standards, it will limit the clientele
of those companies. 83 Clear and specific international standards will be
instrumental in avoiding the confusion and uncertainty of industry about
expected behavior concerning waste management and transfers. Develop-
ing clear and specific international standards and legal assurances that
severe penalties will be imposed if violated will encourage industry's com-
pliance and make waste generators less willing to entrust waste shipments
to enterprises infiltrated by organized crime. Levying severe penalties
when a violation occurs is particularly crucial due to the difficulties in
detecting illegal waste traffickers. Violators must know that once discov-
ered they will endure severe punishment.
2. Liability as a Catharsis and Instrument of Democratic Control
The second argument made by the opponents of the tort system is
more compelling. Opponents argue that a social security system would be
less time-consuming and less costly. However, the tort system presents an
undoubtable advantage: in the domestic arena, suing polluters potentially
not only prevents accidents and provides victims with compensation, it
also empowers the individual284 to force industry to change its negligent
practices. The tort system enables individuals to send a signal to govern-
gaily, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), May 28, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Current File. See also Michael S. Barr et al., The Labor and Environmental Rights
in the Proposed Mexico-United States Free Trade Agreement, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1
(1991).
281. The German Environment Minister, after the scandal of illegal waste transfers to
France, warned against the dangers of an international network of illegal waste traffickers
similar to the one involved in illegal arms and drug deals. See Criminals "Trading in Toxic
Waste," THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File;
Alarming Spread of Illegal Waste Dumping, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Aug. 19, 1992, availa-
ble in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Tony Catterall, Crime in Germany Spreads to
Trash, Aug. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
282. The Executive Director of UNEP claimed also that organized crime was involved
in the waste transfers from Italy and Switzerland to Somalia. The interim government of
Somalia participated in the deal hoping to make profits that would be used to buy more
weapons. When the deal was uncovered, the directors of the company involved had already
disappeared. See Contract to Dump Toxic Waste in Somalia Linked to Firm in Small Vil-
lage Outside Geneva, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), Oct. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File; Somalia, European Firms Dumping Wastes, UNEP To Probe, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Aidan Hart-
ley, Contract Shows Plan to Dump Toxic Waste in Somalia, THE REUTER LIBRARY REPORT,
Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
283. For more details on the international system that must govern transnational waste
movements, see ELLI LOUKA, OVERCOMING NATIONAL BARRIERS IN INTERNATIONAL WASTE
TRADE (forthcoming).
284. See ATIYAH, supra note 272, at 554.
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ments that legislative action is imperative. 8 5 Certainly, in a democracy,
interest groups can always lobby and participate in public hearings. The
advantage that the tort system offers, as opposed to a social security sys-
tem, is that each individual citizen can initiate action and voice concerns
in an adversarial setting. This advantage is very critical because only by
personally initiating action before an impartial judge can accident victims
be persuaded that justice is served. The catharsis of a public trial is espe-
cially important in cases of catastrophic accidents when victims demand
some sort of vindication."' Thus, the tort system serves a dual function.
It acts as a tension release mechanism of social passions. It also in-
troduces an element of direct democracy in corporate boardrooms and
within government bodies where the decisions that affect people are
made. In other words, the tort system instills democratic controls in a
society where democracy is limited to periodic elections."' In this respect,
the tort system is undoubtedly superior to any social insurance system.
The advantages of a tort system over a social insurance system are
also evident in international law. The international community, despite
patterns of cooperation, is still deeply divided between the privileged and
underprivileged, and this division is often the cause of dissention and
conflict. A private liability system can assuage confrontations by empow-
ering the citizens of developing countries to sue multinational corpora-
tions in national courts. This is especially pertinent when social dichoto-
mies are inflamed by catastrophic accidents of international dimensions,
such as the Bhopal incident, that entail not only economic suffering and
property damage but physical injuries and death. In such cases, the pub-
lic often considers a settlement between the state and the corporate en-
tity as unsatisfactory.288 Only the entitlement to compensation through
settlement with the threat of litigation, or through adjudication, can con-
vince victims that justice has been served. It is only through this method
that individuals can be relieved from the helplessness they experience
when confronted with the unexpected consequences of an environmental
accident.
285. See LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 177, at 16 (liability may play a role in "helping
regulators identify potentially unsafe products and encouraging them to take action.").
286. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 272, at 553 (the author emphasizes that the tort sys-
tem is instrumental in appeasing social divisions after catastrophic accidents, as, for exam-
ple, in the case of an accident that involved the collapse of coal tip onto a school that caused
the deaths of 116 children and 28 adults).
287. See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981).
288. India Seeks to Reopen Bhopal Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1990, at D8. Indian
Government Ends Speculation, Announces Support for Bhopal Challenge, 13 INT'L ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 551 (1990). See also Wil Lepkowski, Union Carbide-Bhopal Saga Continues as
Criminal Proceedings Begin in India, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 7, May 16, 1992 (the
$470 million settlement between India and Union Carbide mediated in 1989 by the Indian
Supreme Court encompassed both civil and criminal charges. "But public outcry was so
strong that the court agreed to review its decision. It completed its review last December,
upholding the settlement but restoring the criminal charges it had thrown out as part of the
1989 ruling.").
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The notion that private liability can work as a tension release mecha-
nism in international fora stems from the domain of human rights. For
example, after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,2 8 9 citizens of developing countries
started bringing suits against human rights violators in the courts of the
United States. The purpose of the suits is vindication as opposed to
compensation. 9 '
Citizen participation in the international arena achieves something
more fundamental. In pursuit of justice in transnational fora, citizens es-
sentially join in the formation and strengthening of international rules.
Their cases establish precedents that define acceptable corporate or state
behavior. The importance of. citizen participation is that it is not effectu-
ated through state representation but through direct citizen involvement
in affairs of international dimension. In this fashion, international law is
infused by elements of direct democracy and is transformed from an in-
strument at the disposal of governments to an instrument in the hands of
those truly affected by it.
Viewing the tort system as an instrument capable of introducing di-
rect democracy in the international system could be criticized as unrealis-
tic given the fact that citizens in many countries are not that litigious.
However, this reality is changing at a rapid pace. Environmental groups
in developing countries have started bringing suits against corporate and
government polluters. For example, in Korea, the contamination of
groundwater supplies resulted in criminal charges brought against top
corporate officials.291 In Malaysia, an environmental group brought an ac-
tion against a corporation for the alleged harm to pregnant women and
children caused by radioactive waste dumping.2 92 There also have been
suits on behalf of future generations and suits for failing to comply with
environmental impact assessments. 93
289. 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980) (the case involved a suit of two Paraguayan citizens
against Pena, another Paraguayan citizen and former Inspector General of the Police in
Paraguay. According to the plaintiffs, Pena had tortured to death their son and brother.
The court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort Statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1350, which provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction on any
civil action by an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.").
290. See Larry Rohter, Ex-Ruler of Haiti Faces Human Rights Suit in the US, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at B10 (the objectives of these lawsuits are political and psychological.
As a lawyer for six Haitians formulated it: "There is a message here to other military thugs
and human rights violators, which is that you're not going to get away with it."). Relying on
the Alien Tort Claims Act, human rights groups have filed claims against the Serbian leader
in Bosnia, Radovan Karadzic, on behalf of the women raped during the civil war in the
former Yugoslavia. Because of the lawsuit, Karadzic asked the United States administration
to grant him immunity in order to participate in the peace talks held at the United Nations
headquarters in New York. Paul Lewis, Immunity Sought for Bosnian Serb: Atrocities Suit
in a U.S. Court Cited as Barrier to Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at A8.
291. Michele Corash & Robert Falk, Through a Cleaner Looking Glass, LEGAL TIMES,
May 11, 1992, at 16, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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The growth of national litigation renders an international tort system
for environmental harms extremely relevant. Building such a system
would not necessarily be a panacea for all the procedural hurdles of pri-
vate international law.9 4 It could, however, lay the foundation for a more
coherent action when the circumstances arise. These circumstances are
very likely to develop, given the lack of success of the current interna-
tional system in controlling the international transfers of hazardous and
radioactive wastes. For example, the ban of waste imports into the Afri-
can region 95 has not stopped illegal waste transfers to that area. In fact,
waste exports to impoverished African countries such as Somalia are on
the increase.29 Waste exports to Latin America and Eastern Europe are
also on the rise.2
97
C. A Proposal for a Liability Regime
1. The Liability Component
Strict liability has been established, nationally and internationally, as
the appropriate type of liability for environmental harms-ultra-hazard-
294. See Hans Ulrich Jessurum d'Oliveira, The Sandoz Blaze: The Damage and the
Public and Private Liabilities in Environmental Harm, in ENVIRONMENTAL HARM, supra
note 20, at 429, 442. See Scovazzi, supra note 20, at 395-96. These procedural hurdles stem
from the fact that different countries adopt different conflict of law rules. For example, in
the Sandoz disaster many problems emerged because the countries affected by the disaster
- France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland -have different rules of private inter-
national law. In addition, corporate subsidiaries not having many assets are often involved
in severe accidents. In these cases, plaintiffs have tried to pierce the corporate veil and sue
the parent company in the courts of the state where it is located. An example is the Bhopal
case. The success of these lawsuits has been mixed and the law on this subject needs further
clarification.
In response to the above concerns, certain countries have signed agreements that pro-
vide equal access to national remedies. The principle of equal access agreements is that
plaintiffs suffering damages in a country other than the country where the environmental
accident originated enjoy in the country where the accident originated the same legal treat-
ment as the citizens of that country. However, these agreements are very few and do not
solve the problem that the laws of the country of origin of environmental accident may be
inadequate to deal with such accidents. See Alan E. Boyle, Making the Polluter Pay? Alter-
natives to State Responsibility in Allocation of Transboundary Environmental Costs, in
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM, supra note 20, at 363, 370-73.
295. See supra note 1.
296. See supra note 281-2.
297. For example, banned German pesticides that were labeled as humanitarian aid
were shipped to Romania and Albania without the consent of the governments of these
countries. See Federal, State Environmental Ministers Approve Steps to Curb Illegal
Waste Trade, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), Sept. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Omni File; Greenpeace Finds Loopholes in EC Waste Trade Laws, INTER PRESS SER-
VICE, Oct. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; see also David Clark
Scott, Central American Presidents Seek Regional Solution to Toxic Wastes, THE CHRIS-
TIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 10, 1992, at 5, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File;
Colombia: Government Bans Ship Loaded with Toxic Waste, INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 30,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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ous activities posing non-reciprocal risks to others. The generation, trans-
portation, and disposal of hazardous wastes are such activities. Unlimited
liability, although not yet established in international law, has many pro-
cedural advantages over limited liability. Unlimited liability makes un-
necessary periodic revisions of liability ceilings in order to take into ac-
count cost of living adjustments or in case of unexpected environmental
disasters. In addition, the lack of adverse effects of this type of liability
on insurance, in combination with its function as a tension release mecha-
nism, an instrument of democratic control, and an accident prevention
mechanism, renders its adoption imperative. Pollution victims should be
able to negotiate a settlement or bring an action free of prearranged limi-
tations on the amount of liability they may demand.
Imposing liability on generators for accidents occurring during trans-
portation and disposal is supported by both domestic and regional legisla-
tion as a method that would induce generators to internalize the costs of
producing wastes. Disposers must also be held liable for accidents occur-
ring during disposal. Waste disposers must have the facilities and equip-
ment to verify the quantities and categories of wastes they receive in or-
der to ensure that they are suitable for the type of services they provide.
Disposers must also be held liable for accidents taking place during trans-
port, except in cases where they can prove that they did not have any
control over the transporter or did not participate in her selection.
Imposing liability on transporters is not a common practice. The
Conventions on nuclear liability avoid placing liability on transporters of
nuclear materials - including wastes. The Draft European Community
Directive specifies that waste transporters are liable only for a limited
amount and not liable when they can identify the waste producer. Only
the Convention on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods holds carriers exclu-
sively liable, but only for a limited amount. Exonerating transporters
from liability for accidents during transportation and disposal has yet to
be adequately explained. Waste transporters must examine and verify the
identity and package of wastes. They should refuse delivery if the wastes
are improperly identified in the consignment note or if the package ap-
pears faulty. It is important to establish such a duty because otherwise
transporters would have an incentive to engage in high-risk transfers. At
the same time, waste transporters should be allowed defenses if they can
identify the generator and demonstrate that, under the circumstances,
further examination of wastes was infeasible or that the generator did not
disclose the nature of wastes. However, the negligence of the waste trans-
porter should not be a defense. Other defenses for waste transporters may
be appropriate. This is because generators will often force transporters to
expedite waste shipments and because there is significant room for fraud
when wastes are already packaged and ready for transportation.
In addition, generators, transporters, and disposers must not be held
liable when they have complied with the clear and specific national and
international standards, or when the damage is the result of force
majeure, intentional acts, or omissions of a third party or the victim.- Lia-
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bility must be joint and several when more than one person is liable.29
All actors involved in waste management must have a right of recourse or
subrogation against each other. Such a right will be particularly useful
when waste disposal facilities are situated in developing countries and op-
erated by small or state companies, and the deep-pocket generators are
multinational corporations from a developed country with stricter envi-
ronmental legislation. Such rules would provide generators with incen-
tives to select responsible transporters, for transporters to verify the
types of wastes they transport, and for disposers to make sure that the
wastes they dispose of are actually the wastes mentioned in the manifest.
Liability should cover personal injuries, property, loss of profits, costs of
preventing environmental harm, and the costs to clean the environment.
The costs to be recovered for preventing environmental harm and for
cleaning the environment may be subject to a cost-benefit analysis after
considering the circumstances of each case. Compulsory insurance must
also be imposed, including traditional as well as alternative types of in-
surance. Moreover, given the particular nature of waste management, the
statute of limitations should be extended to twenty or thirty years after
the incident occurs. Finally, the geographical scope of an international
liability regime must include the territory, the territorial sea, and the ex-
clusive economic zone.299
Securing such provisions in an international convention should not
be difficult since most national and international tort law contains similar
provisions for environmental accidents."' It will be difficult, however, to
establish an international standard of proof because national legislation is
still evolving. This standard, because of the long latency periods between
exposure and disease, should allow for reliable epidemiological studies to
be considered. On the other hand, the standard should be flexible enough
to allow courts to adjudicate cases according to the particularities of each
individual case. Claims for emotional distress or for fear of cancer must
also be given careful consideration. Finally, plaintiffs must be able to
choose between the forum where the damage occurred, the forum where
the environmental accident originated, or the place of business of the
generators, transporters, and disposers. Existing conventions that limit
the fora to the place where the incident or damage occurred only en-
courage defections from the established liability regimes when accidents
actually happen and the forum designated does not serve the plaintiffs'
298. Joint and several liability has been adopted by the Draft Convention on Liability
from Activities Dangerous to the Environment. See The Council of Europe, Draft Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting form Activities Dangerous to the Environment,
July 31, 1992, DIR/JUR (92) 3, art. 6(2)-(3). After closure of the site it is provided that the
last operator shall be liable and then the operator can have recourse against any third party.
See id. art. 7.
299. The application of strict and unlimited liability cannot be extended to actions that
take place in the high seas since there is no national or international jurisdiction over the
high seas.
300. See supra sections I & II.
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interests.
It will be difficult to include in a single international instrument
those issues already covered by other international conventions and
under the jurisdiction of different international organizations. As empha-
sized, there exist international conventions that deal with the transporta-
tion of toxic and radioactive wastes along with the transportation of dan-
gerous and nuclear material.3 0' There is also a fragmentation of
international institutions that deal with the transportation of hazardous
and radioactive wastes. In the case of maritime transportation of wastes,
waste shippers may resist the imposition of liability by invoking the
traditional rules of maritime law that place liability on shipowners.
3 0 2
Consequently, given the existing international legislation and different
modes of waste transportation, it will be useful if the protocol to the Ba-
sel Convention is drafted with the cooperation of IMO, IAEA, and
NEA. 0 3 Such cooperation would elucidate many issues.
2. The Social Insurance Component
Additional funding mechanisms should be provided in cases where
businesses are not able to shoulder the full amount of compensation, can-
not be held liable, do not exist anymore, or the settlement or adjudication
procedures take too long because of the nature of the dispute or the over-
loading of national courts. These concerns can best be addressed by a
mixed system comprised of private liability and social insurance compo-
nents. The social insurance component of such a regime may take the
form of a fund. The fund could be modeled after the 1971 and 1984 Fund
Conventions and provide for residual compensation and immediate relief.
It may also provide full compensation in cases where industries are not
liable or do not exist anymore or in cases where national courts rejected
compensation claims because there was no apparent linkage between ex-
posure and disease. In the latter case, plaintiffs may be allowed to file
claims against the fund at least two times after the initial claim if they
can demonstrate with stronger evidence the linkage between exposure
and disease. The fund could additionally provide immediate assistance
during catastrophic accidents and sponsor international relief efforts in
case of environmental disasters in the high-seas.
The Fund could be financed by waste exporting and importing states
301. In addition, during the discussion of the HNS Revision, there was agreement that
the Convention should cover "damage occurring during the carriage of hazardous and nox-
ious substances to the dumping site." See 66th Session Report, supra note 118, at 13. How-
ever, the state parties to the London Dumping Convention have emphasized that the HNS
Convention should apply only to "accidental spillages and loss of waste cargo" and not to
"deliberate disposal at sea of wastes." The latter should be covered by a liability protocol to
the London Dumping Convention. See 67th Session Report, supra note 120, at 17.
302. See supra notes 4-8.
303. It appears that such cooperation already exists. See Discussion of the Protocol to
the Basel Convention, 67th Session Report, supra note 120, at 25.
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in proportion to their wealth and the volumes of wastes they import or
export.3 °4 States can, in turn, tax waste generators, transporters, or dis-
posers. Direct industry financing under the supervision of states should
not be excluded, but it will be more difficult to establish because indus-
tries that generate wastes, unlike industries involved in the oil business,
are very diverse. An alternative approach would be to establish a prelimi-
nary fund involving mandatory contributions of states and voluntary con-
tributions of industry. After the termination of the preliminary period,
the performance of the fund will be evaluated and states will be required
to submit proposals concerning industry's direct contributions to the
fund. For this purpose, during the first stage of the fund, states will have
to accumulate data and sponsor statistical analysis concerning waste pro-
duction, waste exports, and accidents due to waste mismanagement and
transportation for each industrial sector. The advantage of the two-stage
approach is that it would entice industry to contribute to the fund under
the threat that if voluntary contributions are inadequate, they will be-
come mandatory. As evidenced by CRISTAL and TOVALOP, industry is
more willing to contribute to voluntary schemes than to obligatory ones.
The fund could be administered temporarily by an existing international
organization such as the United Nations Environment Programme, the
IAEA, the World Bank, or preferably by an international agency special-
izing in waste management.30 5
CONCLUSION
It is the conclusion of this article that both justice and efficiency
propagate the establishment of an international liability regime for acci-
dents due to waste mismanagement. A strict and unlimited liability sys-
tem will prevent accidents and simultaneously democratize the interna-
tional system without causing any adverse effects on insurance.
304. LOUKA, supra note 1, at 26.
305. Id. at 22-23.
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